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Abstract
When export opportunities arise, the gains from trade can only be materialized if the economy
adjusts. In order to expand and meet new markets, firms must hire new workers and tune
their capital stock by investing in product lines, machines and equipment. If this process is
costly and imperfect, the economy reacts partially and gradually. We formulate a multi-sector
dynamic model featuring capital adjustment costs, firm heterogeneity, and labor mobility costs
that we fit to data from Argentina. We estimate the structural capital and labor adjustment
cost parameters and using counterfactual simulations we quantify the complementarity between
trade shocks and domestic frictions: in the presence of lower costs of factor adjustment there
is a sizeable incremental impact of trade shocks on capital, employment, wages, and output.
The complementarity is larger for smaller trade shocks, and a large fraction of the capital
complementarity is explained by an extensive margin (i.e. firms which do not respond to trade
shocks when adjustment costs are high).
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1 Introduction
When export opportunities arise, the gains from trade can only be materialized if the economy
adjusts. In order to expand and meet new markets, firms must tune their capital stock by investing in
product lines, machines and equipment. This process is costly and imperfect, and, in fact, investment
adjustment may be fully hindered. With labor market frictions, labor adjustment is also costly, and
employment may only adjust sluggishly. In this paper, we explore the complementarity of trade
shocks and domestic factor market frictions: in the presence of lower costs of factor adjustment, there
is an incremental impact of the trade shock that affects the dynamic path of wages, employment,
capital and investment. A profound trade reform or a large export shock (e.g., a significant export
preference) can trigger a proportionally different response than a smaller shock because large shocks
can make factor adjustment profitable, even if it is very costly. Alternatively, a given trade shock
can have a much larger effect under more adequate domestic conditions.
This complementarity between trade and domestic factors features predominantly in the liter-
ature, but its quantification has often been elusive. Early qualitatively evidence is provided by,
for example, Welch, McMillan, and Rodrik (2003), who argue that the negative impacts of the
liberalization of the cashew sector in Mozambique was mainly due to the imperfect structure of the
internal markets. Topalova (2010) shows that trade liberalization had more pronounced impacts on
poverty among Indian states where inflexible labor laws impeded factor reallocation across sectors.
Similarly, Balat, Brambilla and Porto (2009) show that coffee exports had larger poverty reducing
impacts in Ugandan districts with lower marketing costs. These reduced-form papers, among many
others, can only suggest the existence of complementarities. A better sense of the magnitudes can
be grasped from the structural model of Kambourov (2009), who studies trade liberalization with
labor market frictions. He shows that trade reforms can have a larger effect if they are undertaken
jointly with labor market reforms.1 Similarly, Khandelwal, Schott and Wei (2013) study the system
of quota allocation among Chinese textiles and clothing exporters. They show that the gains from
trade are larger than expected because the removal of the quota also removes inefficiencies in the
quota licensing process.2 Yet, while these papers establish that trade reforms can be boosted by
1Concretely, he finds that, in Chile (a low-friction country) trade reforms alone bring welfare gains of 7.3 percent,
while trade reforms concurrent with labor market reforms create welfare gains of 8.3 percent. In Mexico (a high-
friction country), the gains from trade are 4.1 percent and the gains from joint trade and labor reforms are 5 percent.
2They find that 71 percent of the total productivity gain is due to the removal of the licensing regime, while 29
percent is due to quota removal. In addition, they estimate that replacing the politically driven allocation system
with a quota auction would raise industry productivity by 15 percentage points.
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other domestic reforms, they do not provide a direct quantification of the complementary effect.
The objective of our investigation is to explore this interaction between the size of the shock, firm
characteristics, and capital and labor adjustment costs on the dynamic responses of the economy
to trade shocks. These complementarities are bound to be important, especially for developing
countries.
We formulate a dynamic structural model of trade with worker’s intersectoral search and firm’s
capital accumulation decisions. Our framework combines the labor supply model with workers’
mobility costs of Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) with the labor demand model with capital
adjustment costs of Bloom (2009) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). The labor supply side
is characterized by a rational expectations optimization problem of workers facing mobility costs
and time-varying idiosyncratic shocks. The labor demand side is characterized by the rational
expectations intertemporal profit maximization problem of firms facing costs for adjusting their
capital stock and time-varying technology shocks. To deal with trade shocks, our model features
multiple sectors. To deal with general equilibrium effects and labor market responses, we endogenize
equilibrium wages across sectors.3
Firms face different types of costs of capital adjustments. There are convex costs that induce
firms to smooth investment over time. There are also non-convex, fixed, costs that create occasional
investment bursts instead. And there are irreversibilities of investment when installed capital can
be sold at a fraction of the purchasing prices. Overall, these costs generate regions of investment
(and disinvestment) inaction. When a trade shock occurs, some firms will be moved out of this
inaction region and invest. The economy thus adjusts. But many other firms will remain in the
inaction region, especially if the costs of adjustment are high. As a consequence, the economy reacts
partially and gradually.4
The model features a complementarity of trade shocks and factor market frictions. This comple-
3This feature is shared by the trade model of Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) but it is a major difference
with the capital adjustment costs models of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Bloom (2009) in which wages are
exogenous.
4It is noteworthy that the treatment of capital adjustment costs is succinct in the related trade literature. Artuç,
Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) assume fixed capital and Dix-Carneiro (2013) works out an example with arbitrary
costs. In contrast, imperfect labor mobility has been extensively studied. A branch of the literature focuses on workers’
moving sectoral costs (Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren, 2010; Artuç and McLaren, 2013; and Dix-Carneiro, 2013)
and workers’ sector-specific experience (Coşar, 2013; Dix-Carneiro, 2013; Davidson and Matusz, 2004; Davidson and
Matusz, 2006; and Davidson and Matusz, 2010; Ritter, 2012). Another set of explanations focuses on firm behavior
and includes firing and hiring costs (Kambourov, 2009; Dix-Carneiro, 2013) and market search frictions (Coşar, 2013;
and Coşar, Guner and Tybout, 2013). All these studies conclude that large adjustment costs may lead to large
unrealized gains from trade.
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mentarity materializes as an incremental or additional effect of the trade shock when factor market
frictions are reduced or eliminated. If a trade shock is large, or if a given trade shock arrives in a
setting with lower costs, then the adjustment is fuller and quicker.
We fit our model to plant-level panel data and household survey data from Argentina. We use
the firm-level data to identify the technology and capital adjustment cost parameters that define
labor demand. We use the panel component of the household survey data to identify the labor
mobility costs parameters. We recover the structural parameters that characterize the frictions
faced by both workers and firms. We then combine all these estimates to simulate a stationary
steady-state of the economy. Finally, we use the estimated parameters to compute counterfactual
adjustments of investment, capital, labor allocations and wage distributions across sectors after a
trade shock. We also study the impacts on output and exports.
The simulations show that a positive trade shock to the Food & Beverages sector, whose domestic
price increases, triggers a gradual increase of the capital stock. There is also a relatively sluggish
response of the labor market. Real wages increase at first in Food and Beverages but decline
elsewhere. Workers gradually reallocate towards the expanding sector, and wages start to decline
(while real wages in all other sectors slightly recover). The value of firms in Food & Beverages
increases instead steadily during the whole transition. The trade shock relatively benefits firms
and workers in the affected sector, vis-á-vis firms and workers in other sectors. Within the affected
sectors, entrepreneurs, more than workers, are the real beneficiaries of the shock.
To empirically explore the complementarity of trade shocks and domestic frictions, we simulate
counterfactual economies in which trade shocks occur in the absence of fixed cost and irreversibility
of investment, and in which workers mobility costs are reduced by half. As expected, the economy
adjusts much more abruptly and quickly when frictions to factor adjustment are reduced. To
compute the complementarity we decompose the total change in aggregate variables into a trade
shock effect, a change in capital adjustment and labor mobility costs effect, and a complementarity
effect (how much more the economy reacts to a trade shock when capital adjustment and labor
mobility costs are lower).
We find that the short run reaction of aggregate capital to a trade shock is 78 percent higher
when fixed costs and irreversibilities are eliminated, and that 90 percent of this complementarity
effect is explained by the reaction of firms that choose not to invest in the baseline steady state
(extensive margin). Since the complementarity is largely driven by initial investment inaction, it
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is larger in the short run and for small trade shocks, as both in the long run and upon facing
larger shocks firms are more likely to move out of the inaction region and thus the reduction of
adjustment costs becomes less significant. Employment complementarities are sizeable when both
capital adjustment costs and labor mobility costs are reduced, accounting for a response to a trade
shock that is 47 percent higher than under the baseline scenario. As expected, the trade-capital
costs complementarity affects capital relatively more than employment, while the trade-labor costs
complementarity affects employment relatively more than capital. Complementarities in output,
exports, wages and firm value are smaller but also relevant, especially when capital adjustment
costs and labor mobility costs are reduced jointly. The elimination of fixed costs and irreversibilities
in investment create a positive, but small, complementarity in wages, whereas a reduction in mobility
costs implies that wages react less to a trade shock (negative complementarity), as differences in
wages across sectors are due to imperfect mobility. Our conclusion is that the implications of a
trade reform or a trade shock can be very different for economies with varying levels of domestic
distortions.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the theoretical model of firm and
worker behavior in the presence of capital adjustment costs and labor mobility costs. In section 3, we
discuss the data, the estimation strategy and the main results. In section 4, we compute a stationary
rational expectations equilibrium and we estimate the effects of trade liberalization on investment
and labor markets by performing counterfactual simulations. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop the general equilibrium structural model that we use to explore how the
economy adjusts to a trade shock in the presence of factor adjustment costs. Firms face capital
adjustment costs, as in Bloom (2009) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), and workers face labor
mobility costs, as in Artuç, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010). The behavior of firms is described
in section 2.1. The dynamic optimization problem of the firms delivers a set of supply functions
for output and a set of demand functions for investment and labor in each of the sectors, given
product prices and the costs of adjusting capital. The behavior of workers is described in section
2.2. Workers maximize utility. They choose a consumption bundle, given their income and product
prices, and they choose a sector of employment, given wages and the costs of mobility. In our
model, both capital and labor are homogeneous. This is a simplification that allows us to work with
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traditional models of trade amended to accommodate capital adjustment costs, differences in wages
across sectors, and gradual mobility while keeping the firms and workers models compatible. Coşar
(2013), Dix-Carneiro (2013) and Kambourov (2009) are recent examples of empirical trade models
with labor heterogeneity. In section 2.3 we present the equilibrium of the economy and, in section
2.4, we discuss some new features of our model vis-à-vis the related literature.
2.1 Firms: Labor Demand, Investment, and Output Supply
The purpose of our model of firm behavior is to derive investment, labor demand, and output supply
functions of different sectors in the presence of costly capital adjustment. There are J sectors in
the economy; J − 1 of these sectors are exportable or importable manufactures, and the remaining
sector is a large non-manufacturing/non-tradable sector.5 Each sector is composed of a continuum
of firms.
In a given sector j, production technology is Cobb-Douglas:
Qj(Aijt,Kijt, Lijt) = AijtK
αjK
ijt L
αjL
ijt ,(1)
where Aijt is a Hicks-neutral productivity shock faced by firm i at time t, Kijt is the capital stock
and Lijt is the labor input. Productivity shocks Aijt follow a first-order Markov Process. Firms
differ in Aijt, so that the productivity shocks are a source of firm heterogeneity that trigger different
investment and employment decisions. The coefficients αjK and α
j
L are estimable parameters, as is
the transition function for Aijt, which we specify in section 3.
Labor is a variable input that adjusts freely, whereas capital is subject to adjustment costs.
Investment becomes productive with a one period lag so that capital accumulation is given by:
(2) Kij,t+1 = (1− δj)Kijt + Iijt,
where Iijt denotes gross investment and δj is the capital depreciation rate.
To model capital adjustment costs, we adopt the specification in Bloom (2009) and Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006), which includes three types of costs: fixed adjustment costs, quadratic
5In the empirical implementation of the model in section 3 we work with 5 manufacturing sectors and 1 non-
tradable sector for a total of J=6 sectors.
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adjustment costs, and partial investment irreversibilities. The cost function is
Gj(Kijt, Iijt) = γ
j
1Kijt 1[Iijt 6= 0] + γj2(Iijt/Kijt)2Kijt +(3)
+ pjbIijt 1[Iijt > 0] + p
j
sIijt 1[Iijt < 0],
where 1[Iijt 6= 0], 1[Iijt > 0] and 1[Iijt < 0] are indicator variables that are equal to one when invest-
ment is non-zero, strictly positive, and strictly negative, respectively. The first term captures fixed
adjustment costs, which are paid whenever investment or disinvestment take place. Fixed costs are
independent of the investment level in order to capture non-convexities and increasing returns to
the installation of new capital. We assume that these costs are proportional to the pre-existing
stock of capital Kijt at the firm level. Proportionality with respect to K captures the fact that as
a firm grows larger fixed costs of investment do not become irrelevant, and, on the contrary, the
importance of indivisibilities, plant restructuring, worker retraining and interruption of production,
increase with firm size.6
The second term in (3) captures the quadratic adjustment costs. These are variable costs that
increase with the level of the investment rate. Variable costs are higher when the investment rate
changes rapidly. We assume these costs are proportional to the predetermined level of capital as
well. These costs are motivated by the observation in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) who argue for the
existence of increasing costs in the incorporation new capital, in the reorganization of production
lines and in worker’s training.
Finally, the last two terms in (3) capture partial irreversibilities related to transactions costs,
reselling costs, capital specificity and asymmetric information (as in the market for lemons). These
costs are incorporated into the model by assuming a gap between the buying price pjb and selling
price pjs of capital so that pjb > p
j
s.
The presence of fixed costs and irreversibilities generates a region of inaction for the firm, as well
as regions of investment and disinvestment bursts. Following a negative shock firms may hold on to
capital in order to avoid fixed costs and reselling losses; conversely, in periods of high profitability,
firms may choose not to increase the capital stock as much, in anticipation of eventual future costs
of selling that capital, or not at all, to avoid fixed costs. Quadratic adjustment costs, on the other
hand, create incentives to smooth out investment over time. In the empirical section, we estimate
6Fixed costs can be modeled as proportional to the level of sales or profits at the plant-level; see for example
Bloom (2009), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Caballero and Engel (1999). Alternatively fixed costs can also be
modeled as independent of firm size, as in Rho and Rodrigue (2012).
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the fixed cost parameter γj1, the quadratic cost parameter γ
j
2, and the ratio of selling to buying price
γj3 = p
j
s/p
j
b.
Regarding product markets, we assume that products are homogeneous, that firms are small, and
that all manufactures are tradable. The country is small and faces exogenously given international
prices p∗jt. To simplify, we assume that the government does not set any trade taxes, but these
can be easily incorporated into the model. Domestic prices faced by producers are pjt = p∗jt. In
the non-manufacturing sector, prices are endogenously determined in a competitive market. In
each industry, we assume weakly decreasing returns to scale (αjL + α
j
K ≤ 1), due to fixed factors
such as managerial capacity, an assumption that is supported by the estimation results. Since
firms are heterogeneous in productivity and prices are exogenous, this is a sufficient condition to
prevent the most productive firms from completely sweeping the market.7 We make two further
simplifying assumptions regarding participation. First, we do not model the decision to enter or
exit the domestic market. That is, the number of firms is fixed and there are no fixed costs of
production so that even the least productive firms find it profitable to produce. Second, we do not
model the decision to export. Since firms face a perfectly elastic demand, the decision to export
does not play any role in this model.8
Given the predetermined level of capital and the productivity shock, firms choose labor to
maximize instantaneous profits. From the static profit maximization problem we obtain firm-level
labor demand and output supply. Let µjt denote the cross-section joint distribution of capital and
productivity (K,A) in sector j, and let the mass of firms be normalized to one. Integrating firm-
level labor demand and output supply over the distribution of firms, and given the Cobb-Douglas
assumption on technology, we obtain aggregate labor demand for sector j Ndj and aggregate output
7Without capital adjustment costs, strictly decreasing returns to scale would be a necessary and sufficient condition.
8It is theoretically straightforward to work with a monopolistic competition model that incorporates market power,
constant marginal costs, and firm participation decisions. However, the assumption of fixed international prices seems
more realistic for a small Argentine manufacturing sector. In addition, the monopolistic competition model would
require the estimation of a larger number of parameters, such as elasticities of substitution, and number of varieties,
that can complicate the already complex estimation method. Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010), Coşar (2013),
Dix-Carneiro (2013), Kambourov (2009), among others, adopt similar modeling assumptions. Instead, see Coşar,
Guner, and Tybout (2013) and Rho and Rodrigue (2012) for related models with monopolistic competition.
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supply Y j
Ndj(st) =
∫
(K,A)
[(
αjLpjt
wjt
)
AKα
j
K
]1/(1−αjL)
µjt (dK × dA)(4)
Y j(st) =
∫
(K,A)
(αjLpjt
wjt
)αjL
AKα
j
K
1/(1−α
j
L)
µjt (dK × dA).(5)
The state variables are the firm-level productivity shock Aijt and capital stock Kijt as well as a
vector st of aggregate variables. The aggregate state variables are the prices of all tradable sectors pt
(j = 1, . . . , J−1), the cross-section distributions of firms for all sectors µt, and the labor allocations
in all sectors Nt. Wages and prices of non-tradables are determined endogenously in equilibrium
and thus are not included among the state variables. Labor allocations are endogenous as well, but
predetermined at time t, as we will discuss in the workers’ model.
The investment decision is based on the maximization of intertemporal operating profits net of
capital adjustment costs. The Bellman equation is:
V j(Aijt,Kijt; st) = max
Iijt
{pij(Aijt,Kijt; st)−Gj(Kijt, Iijt) + βEtV j(Aij,t+1,Kij,t+1; st+1)},(6)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor and pij are maximized instantaneous profits.9 Et is the
expectation operator conditional on information available at time t and taken over the productivity
shocks and output prices.10 We will make more specific assumptions about the stochastic processes
of productivity and prices when we describe the estimation method and simulation exercises. The
solution to the Bellman equation leads to the following policy function:
(7) Iijt = Ij(Aijt,Kijt, st).
To sum up, at time t, the capital stock is predetermined. GivenK, the realization of the profitability
shock A, and the aggregate state variables, profit maximization delivers optimal levels of labor
demand and output supply, as well as, given the costs of adjustment, the optimal level of investment.
Due to the presence of fixed costs and irreversibilities, some firms may not react to shocks that are
not large enough. Investment determines firm-level capital for next period and, together with the
9Firm-level instantaneous profits are given by pij(Aijt,Kijt; st) = (1 − αjL)
[(
αjL/wjt
)αj
L pjtAijtK
α
j
K
ijt
]1/(1−αj
L
)
.
10The evolution of capital, labor allocations, and firm distributions, on the other hand, is endogenous.
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stochastic process of productivity, next period firm distribution. For manufacturing, since goods are
tradable and prices are exogenously determined, firms sell all their output at those prices. Instead,
prices for non-manufactures must clear the market. Wages must adjust to equate demand and
supply. Equilibrium wages, labor allocations, and prices for non-tradables are further described in
the next two sections.
2.2 Workers: Labor Supply and Output Demand
To characterize the behavior of workers, we follow the labor mobility cost model of Artuç, Chaudhuri,
and McLaren (2010). This is a dynamic discrete choice model in which workers choose their sector of
employment based on wages, job quality, mobility costs, and idiosyncratic utility shocks. The model
predicts equilibrium worker mobility, equilibrium wage differentials, and dynamic responses.11
The economy is populated by a continuum of homogeneous workers with measure N¯ . Workers
are assumed to have Cobb-Douglas preferences defined over consumption of goods, so that they
spend a constant fraction φj of their labor income in good j. All individuals are risk neutral, have
rational expectations, and are employed in one of the J sectors. A worker l ∈ [0, N¯ ] employed in
sector j at time t perceives an indirect instantaneous mean utility (optimized over consumption of
goods) defined as
(8) ujt =
wjt
Pt
+ ηj
where wjt is the sector nominal wage, Pt is a price index, and ηj is a time-invariant utility shifter,
which could be interpreted as the quality of employment in sector j.12 These terms are common
to all workers. At the end of the period, workers have the option to move to another sector at
a cost. Workers can move within manufacturing sectors and also between manufacturing and the
non-tradable sector. The cost of moving from sector j to sector k is Cjk, with Cjj = 0 for all j.
In addition to the common mean utility and moving costs, workers have heterogeneous prefer-
ences over sectors captured by a vector εlt that is realized at the end of period t. A worker l that
11Note that the model allows for wage differentials across sectors but not for wage heterogeneity across firms (in a
given sector). All firms pay the same market wage. We can thus study inter-sectoral labor mobility but we do not
deal with intra-sectoral mobility.
12The instantaneous mean utility function of a worker employed in sector j defined over goods and job quality is
u˜j =
∏J
h=1 x
φh
h∏J
h=1
φ
φh
h
+ ηj , where xh denotes consumption of good h and
∑J
h=1 φh = 1. Optimizing with respect to x we
obtain the indirect utility function (8) with a price index given by logP =
∑J
h=1 φh log ph.
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chooses sector j at the end of t receives the idiosyncratic benefit εljt. Workers learn the values εljt
for all sectors j before deciding to stay in their current sector or to move. For tractability, as in
Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010), these shocks are independently and identically distributed
across individuals, sectors and time.13
The worker’s problem is to maximize the expected discounted value of being in a sector, net of
mobility costs, by choosing the sector of employment at each time period. The state variables in the
decision are the current sector of employment and vector of idiosyncratic shocks εlt as well as the
aggregate state variables st = (pt, Nt, µt). Output prices, labor allocations and firm distributions
together determine equilibrium wages. The Bellman equation of a worker l in sector j who chooses
sector k at the end of t is
U j(εlt, st) =
wjt
Pt
+ ηj + max
k
{
εlkt − Cjk + βEtUk(εl,t+1, st+1)
}
,(9)
where β is a discount factor and Et is the expectation operator conditional on information at t and
taken over idiosyncratic utility shocks and output prices.
As it is standard in discrete choice models, we assume that εljt follows a type 1 extreme value
distribution with location parameter −νγ and scale parameter ν.14 This assumption is convenient
because the idiosyncratic shock ε can be integrated out analytically. The costs Cjk, the variance of
the idiosyncratic utility shocks ν, and job quality ηj are estimable parameters.
Denote by W j(st) the expectation of U j(εlt, st) with respect to the vector ε. Thus, W j(st) can
be interpreted as the expected value of being in sector j, conditional on st but before the worker
learns his realization of εlt, or ex-ante value function. We have that
(10) W j(st) =
wjt
Pt
+ ηj + E max
k
{
−Cjk + lkt + βEtW k(wt+1)
}
.
Let mjk be the fraction of agents who switch from sector j to sector k. This is the probability
of choosing k conditional on being in j. Under the extreme value distributional assumption, the
13For consistency with Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010), we adopt their timing convention for idiosyncratic
shocks.
14The cdf is F (εljt) = exp (− exp (−εljt/ν − γ)), with E (εljt) = 0, and V ar (εljt) = pi2ν2/6. The parameter γ is
the Euler’s constant.
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conditional choice probability of moving from j to k takes the usual multinomial logit form
(11) mjk(st) =
exp
((−Cjk + βEtW k(st+1)) 1ν )
J∑
h=1
exp
(
(−Cjh + βEtW h(st+1)) 1ν
) ,
and the ex-ante value function of being in sector j (Rust, 1987) is given by,
(12) W j(st) =
wjt
Pt
+ ηj + ν log
J∑
h=1
exp
((
−Cjh + βEtW h(st+1)
) 1
ν
)
.
The total number of agents moving from j to k, or gross flow, is equal to mjk(st)Njt, where Njt
is the number of workers employed in sector j at time t. The transition equation governing the
allocation of labor between sectors is thus given by
Nj,t+1 =
∑
k 6=j
mkj(st)Nkt +m
jj(st)Njt.(13)
This shows that, on aggregate, the individual decisions at time t determine the labor supply to each
sector j at time t + 1. At time t, the current labor allocation is predetermined and upon shocks
to labor demand the labor market adjusts only through changes in wages. Wages and employment
continue gradually adjusting to the new steady state from t+ 1 onwards.
With Cobb-Douglas preferences, expenditure in a good is a share of total income, which is given
by the sum of wage income and profits (net of adjustment costs). Aggregate demand for good j at
prices pjt = p∗jt is
Djt =
φj
pjt
J∑
h=1
(
whtNht +
∫
K,A
[
pih(K,A; st)−Gh(K, I(K,A; st))
]
µht (dK × dA)
)
.(14)
2.3 Equilibrium
All markets are competitive. All tradable sectors face exogenous prices, with domestic prices equal
to international prices plus trade taxes. Sectors in which supply is larger than demand are net
exporters, whereas sectors in which supply is smaller than demand are net importers. Gross trade
flows are not determined. Equilibrium prices for non-tradable goods must equate domestic supply
to domestic demand given by equations (5) and (14).
Aggregate labor demand in each sector, given by equation (4), together with current labor
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allocation (13), determines wages both within manufactures and in the non-tradable sector. Then,
given each firm’s current profitability shock, the capital stock, and the equilibrium wage paid in the
sector, firms choose investment in period t. These decisions determine the current period investment
and influence the following period’s (t+ 1) firm distribution and labor demand for each sector. On
the other hand, each worker observes sector wages and his idiosyncratic shock ε and decides whether
to remain in his current sector or move. In the aggregate, these decisions determine the following
period’s labor allocation. Supply of capital is assumed to be perfectly elastic with time-invariant
prices (as in a small economy open to international capital flows).
The previous equilibrium conditions hold for all time periods and all vectors of aggregate state
variables. We are also interested in defining a stationary equilibrium, which we will use in simulation
exercises to study trade shocks. In a stationary equilibrium, there are firm-specific productivity
shocks and worker-specific utility shocks, but there are no aggregate shocks to prices of tradables and
average productivity. As a consequence, while we observe fluctuations in firm-level labor demand,
investment and output, and in worker-level mobility, there are no fluctuations at the aggregate level.
To define a stationary equilibrium we add the condition that labor allocations, aggregate capital,
output, wages, prices of non-tradables, and the distribution of firms are time-invariant.
2.4 Discussion
We end with a brief discussion of some of the distinguishing features of our model vis-à-vis the
related trade and macro literature. In this paper, we are interested in trade shocks and, for this
purpose, we need to develop a multi-sector model. Some sectors compete with imports, others are
net exporters, and yet others are non-traded. These sectors in principle respond differently to trade
shocks. In addition to the multi-sector feature, we endogenize equilibrium wages across sectors. This
is done, as explained, by modeling labor demand on the firm side and labor supply of the workers
side. This implies that sectoral wages respond to the trade shock, which allows us to study labor
market adjustment and distributional issues. This is a major difference with the seminal papers on
capital adjustment costs such as Bloom (2009) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
There is another important difference with the literature. Bloom (2009) models a one-sector
economy where firms face both capital and labor adjustment costs but workers move freely (and
wages are not determined endogenously). We develop a model where workers face mobility costs
and firms face capital adjustment costs, but not labor adjustment costs (such as firing and hiring
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costs). Our setting does not lend itself to adding labor adjustment costs on the firm side. The
estimated labor mobility costs, as in Artuç, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010), are a reduced form
measure of mobility costs imposed by labor market frictions, including the costs faced by both firms
and workers. Thus, including labor adjustment costs to the firm optimization problem implies a
double counting of some of the labor mobility costs. We prefer this setting because it allows for
differences in wages across sectors and for general equilibrium effects, in particular on wages.
3 Estimation
In this section, we estimate the different components of the theoretical model, which comprise
parameters related to the firms’ and workers’ decision problems, using Argentine data. We estimate
the parameters associated with each of these problems separately, relying on different methodologies,
and using two main data sources: a panel of firms and a panel of workers. We work with 6 sectors:
“Food and Beverages”, “Apparel, Leather and Textiles”, “Nonmetallic Minerals”, “Primary Metals and
Fabricated Metal Products”, “Other Manufactures”, and “Services.” The Services sector corresponds
to non-tradable goods. We begin with firm choices in section 3.1, and we move to worker choices in
section 3.2.
3.1 Firms
The estimation of the firms’ problem requires panel data with detailed information on the investment
decision of the firms. In particular, to fit the capital adjustment cost model, we need data on
purchases of new capital as well as on sales of installed capital. We estimate the model using an
Argentine manufacturing survey, the Encuesta Industrial Anual (EIA, or Annual Industrial Survey),
which meets these requirements. Note that the EIA covers only the manufacturing sector.15
We use a balanced panel from the EIA consisting of 568 Argentine manufacturing plants for
the period 1994-2001. The EIA dataset provides information on gross revenue, costs, intermediate
inputs, employment, consumption of energy and fuels, inventory stock, and both gross expenditures
and gross sales of capital. Information on gross capital sales is important in order to estimate
the role of partial irreversibility in the capital adjustment costs structure. More details about the
construction of the variables are given in Appendix A.1.
15See below for the non-manufacturing sector strategy.
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The firms’ model is defined by parameters of the production function, the stochastic evolution
of variables, the adjustment cost function, the depreciation rate, and the discount factor. Since the
firms’ problem does not have a closed form solution, we recover the main parameters of interest
with a simulated method of moments estimator, as in Bloom (2009) and Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006).16 Given the large parameter set, which requires numerically searching over a large number
of parameters with a computationally-intensive objective function, and given the small number of
firms in the panel data, we follow Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and combine different strategies to
recover different parameters—thus improving the reliability of the numerical search. In particular,
since we are especially interested in the capital adjustment cost parameters, we limit the simulated
method of moments to the estimation of these parameters.
To begin with, we set the depreciation rate δ at 0.0991 and the discount factor β at 0.95, both
common to all firms and all sectors. To compute δ, we use sectoral depreciation rates for the U.S.
(reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis) and calculate an average weighted by sector size
(using the number of firms in each sector as weights).
To estimate the production function parameters αL and αK , we use the method of Olley and
Pakes (1996). Since many firms report zero investment, we use materials as a proxy (Levinsohn
and Petrin, 2003). Also, since there are relatively few firms in each sector, we estimate a common
set of technology parameters for all firms. Results are reported in Panel A of Table 1. The labor
coefficient is 0.5892 and the capital coefficient is 0.1420, and both are statistically significant.17 The
estimated production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
The EIA surveys firms in the manufacturing sector only, and we do not have comparable data
to estimate the parameters of technology for the non-tradable sector. However, it is important
to include this sector in the analysis because it accounts for almost 80 percent of employment in
Argentina. To do this, we calibrate, rather than estimate, the parameters of the production function.
We set the values αL, αK , and the mean of the profitability shock (A) to minimize a quadratic loss
function. In particular, for any set of parameter values for the non-traded sector, we compute the
aggregate steady state level of capital as well as the predicted employment level (given the observed
sectoral wages). Then, the loss function matches the predicted sectoral employment, the predicted
ratio of non-manufacturing to manufacturing capital, and the predicted shares of labor and capital
16See Ruge-Murcia (2007) for a comparative analysis of different methods to estimate dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models.
17These results are comparable to those obtained by Pavcnik (2002) for Chile, for example.
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in revenue with their observed counterparts. Information on aggregate capital by sector and the
capital share of revenue come from the National Institute of Statistics and Census of Argentina
(INDEC) input-output matrix for the year 1997, while information on employment and wages come
from our dataset. The calibrated parameters for the non-manufacturing sector are displayed in
Panel A of Table 1. The labor coefficient is 0.3402 and the capital coefficient is 0.1153. There are
also strong decreasing returns to L and K in the non-manufacturing sector.
What follows is closely based on Bloom (2009) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). To estimate
the adjustment cost parameters we first need to specify the stochastic processes of the productivity
shocks Aijt and prices of tradable products pt, since firms form rational expectations about future
values of these variables prior to their investment decisions, as per Bellman equation (6). Here
we make two important assumptions. First, we assume for estimation purposes that firms form
expectations about future wages based on an exogenous stochastic process. This assumption al-
lows us to separately estimate the firms and workers structural parameters, a separation we need
due to the computation complexity of our full model.18 The second assumption is that we sum-
marize the stochastic process of productivity, prices and wages by the stochastic process of a new
variable which we refer to as “profitability,” and which we denote by A˜ijt. Based on the Cobb-
Douglas definition of indirect instantaneous profits piijt = (1−αjL)[(αjL/wjt)α
j
LpjtAijtK
αjK
ijt ]
1/(1−αjL),
we define profitability as a combination of productivity, wages and product prices given by
A˜ijt =
[
(αjL/wjt)
αjLpjtAijt
]1/(1−αjL). Any variation in trade taxes is also assumed to be part of
the stochastic process for profitability. We measure profitability from data on profits, capital, and
the estimates of the production function parameters, again following the definition of indirect in-
stantaneous profits, so that measured profitability is given by A˜ijt = piijt/[(1− α̂L)Kα̂K/(1−α̂L)ijt ].
Since the objective is to generate model-based moments and compare them with data-based
moments, we need profitability shocks to recreate a non-stationary economy.19 We thus model
18The assumption that wages follow an exogenous stochastic process is analogous to assumptions made by Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006), by Bloom (2009), and in the dynamic IO literature, for example Hendel and Nevo (2006)
and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012), in which dynamic consumer demand is modeled according to an exogenous
evolution of prices. In our model sectoral wages are determined endogenously in equilibrium. Computing the ex-
pectation of wages as a result of equilibrium in the labor market, however, would not only require estimating the
firm and workers problem jointly, but it would also involve a very large state space including firm level variables
and aggregate level variables, among which are the employment allocations to each of the 6 sectors. The combina-
tion of the two factors (large state space and solving both problems jointly) renders the estimation computationally
intractable since searching over the structural parameters requires solving the model thousands of times. We thus
adopt the assumption that firms form expectations about future wages according to an exogenous stochastic process,
for estimation purposes.
19In contrast, we shut down aggregate shocks in the simulation exercises in order to focus on permanent changes
in the prices of tradable goods and the transition from one stationary equilibrium to another one.
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profitability as the interaction of an economy-wide technology shock (bt) and a firm-level component
(eijt).
(15) ln A˜ijt = bt + eijt.
Aggregate profitability bt follows a first order, two-state (high and low), Markov process with sym-
metric transition matrix. To create sufficient serial correlation, we set the diagonal elements of the
transition matrix to 0.8 as in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
Idiosyncratic profitability follows a first order autoregressive Markov process given by:
(16) eijt = ρeeij,t−1 + ζijt,
where ζit ∼ N(0, σe) and ρe is the first order autocorrelation coefficient. The coefficients ρe and σe
are critical for understanding key moments associated with the investment rate, such as investment
bursts or investment inaction. To simplify, these parameters are also common to all sectors.
We estimate ρe and σe with an OLS regression of deviations of profitability from its year mean.20
Panel B of Table 1 reports an estimate of the moments for the idiosyncratic component of the
profitability shock. Idiosyncratic shocks to the firm are highly autocorrelated. From the plant-
level data, ρe is estimated at 0.8853 for the full sample. We also estimate large variance for the
innovations of the idiosyncratic shock process, with a standard deviation (σe) of 0.6652. We adopt
these parameters for firms in the non-manufacturing sector as well.
We estimate the vector of capital adjustment cost parameters Γ = (γ1, γ2, γ3) by simulated
method of moments (SMM). The SMM is based on minimizing the distance between empirical
moments generated from observed firms, and simulated moments generated from artificial firms
that behave as described in the model (McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989).
For a given vector of adjustment cost parameters Γ, and given the estimates of the production
function and stochastic process of profitability, we solve the Bellman equation iteratively and obtain
the policy function Ij(Aijt,Kijt; st; Γ).21 We simulate a panel of artificial firms by taking random
20The regression takes the form
(
A˜ijt − 1n
∑
i∈j A˜ijt
)
= ρe
(
A˜ij,t−1 − 1n
∑
i∈j A˜ij,t−1
)
+ζ˜ijt, where n is the number
of firms.
21We discretize the state space of variables K, K′ (the next period capital stock), and A˜ with a grid of 400 ×
400 × 22. The 22 states for profitability correspond to the 2 aggregate states and 11 idiosyncratic states which
are discretized from the continuous AR(1) process in equation (16) following Tauchen and Hussey (1991). See Rust
(1996) for a detailed discussion of the conditions that ensure convergence of a Value Function.
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draws of initial capital and a series of profitability shocks.22 From the simulated data we compute a
vector of simulated moments, denoted by Ψs(Γ). The simulated moments depend on the adjustment
cost parameters through the policy function Ij(.). Let Ψ denote the vector of empirical moments.
These are analogous to the simulated moments but computed from the actual firm data. The
estimator for the adjustment costs minimizes the weighted distance between the empirical and
simulated moments. Formally,
Γ̂ = arg min
Γ
[Ψ−Ψs(Γ)]′W [Ψ−Ψs(Γ)](17)
where W is a weighting matrix. We use the optimal weighting matrix given by the inverse of
the variance covariance matrix of [Ψ − Ψs(Γ)].23 Standard errors for the estimates are computed
analytically, as in Bloom (2009).
Since the function Ψs(Γ) is not analytically tractable, the minimization is performed using
numerical techniques. We use a simulated annealing algorithm to minimize the criterion function.
This algorithm works well in a case like ours, with a discretized state space and the potential
presence of local minima and discontinuities in the criterion function across the parameter space.24
To implement the SMM estimator, we choose moments that describe both the cross-section and
time series behavior of the investment rate. Concretely, following Bloom (2009), Cooper and Halti-
wanger (2006), Caballero and Engel (2003) and Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999), we match
four fairly standard moments. The first two are the serial correlation of the investment rate and the
correlation between the investment rate and the profitability shock, because these moments are very
sensitive to the structure of the capital adjustment costs. The other two moments are the positive
and negative spikes rates, defined as the percentage of firms with investment and disinvestment
above 20 percent.25 These moments capture the fact that the investment rate distribution at the
plant-level is asymmetric with a fat right tail, as shown in Figure 1.
22We draw a Markov Chain with 1100 time periods for each of 568 firms. We drop the first 100 periods from the
simulated data so that the simulation is independent of the initial conditions.
23Lee and Ingram (1991) show that the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the actual moments is a
consistent estimator for the optimal weighting matrix. We use 1,000 bootstrap replications on actual data to generate
the variance-covariance matrix of the actual moments.
24For the first 1500 iterations, the updated set of parameters is based on a randomization from the best prior
guess. From iteration 1500 onwards, we add a directional component to the parameter search. We also program the
algorithm so that the variance of the randomization declines with the number of iterations, allowing the SMM to
refine the parameter estimates around the global best fit. We set up the estimation with different initial parameters
and seeds to ensure convergence to the global minimum.
25The investment rate exceeds 20 percent for 14 percent of firms.
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Table 1, Panel C, presents our estimates for all three forms of capital adjustment costs along with
the standard errors of these estimates. We also report both the observed moments and simulated
moments that we match. Due to small sample sizes, we estimate a common set of adjustment cost
parameters for all sectors.
The estimated adjustment costs imply large fixed cost, large reselling costs, and large quadratic
costs. All the parameters estimated are found to be significantly different from zero. We estimate
a fixed cost γ̂1 = 0.145. This is a substantial cost since it implies that the fixed cost of adjust-
ment is about 14.5 percent of the average plant-level capital value. The estimated coefficient for
the quadratic adjustment cost parameter (γ̂2) equals 0.113. Using the quadratic adjustment cost
function and a steady state investment rate equal to the depreciation rate (I/K = δ = 0.0991), the
estimated parameter implies an adjustment cost relative to the average plant-level capital of 0.056
percent. Finally, our estimate of the transaction costs (γ̂3 = 0.914) implies that resale of capital
goods would incur a loss of about 8.6 percent of its original purchase price. Robustness of the SMM
estimates to different moments are reported in Appendix A.2.
Our estimates of capital adjustment cost parameters for Argentina can be directly compared with
those in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) for the U.S. as we use the same specifications. As expected,
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) estimate smaller fixed costs (γUS1 = 0.039), smaller quadratic ad-
justment costs (γUS2 =0.049), and smaller partial irreversibilities (γUS3 = 0.975). This implies that
capital is more flexible in the U.S. than in Argentina. These differences, as well as the magnitudes
of the estimates, are, however, sensible and plausible.26
3.2 Workers
The estimation of the workers’ problem parameters requires panel data on workers’ sector of em-
ployment and wages in order to estimate the labor mobility costs, as well as consumption weights
for each sector in order to calibrate aggregate demand. The first row of Panel A) in Table 2 shows
the average CPI weights of each product, obtained from National Accounts data. Because demand
is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, a constant fraction given by the CPI weights is spent on each
product regardless of prices and income.
26Bloom (2009) reports larger values for the partial irreversibility cost, with capital reselling losses of 42.7 percent,
and for the quadratic adjustment cost parameter (0.996). The fixed cost parameter γ1, which is estimated in terms
of annual sales (instead of average capital), is 1.1 percent. Note that these results are not directly comparable to
ours because of differences in specification.
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We estimate the labor mobility model using the panel sample of the Encuesta Permanente de
Hogares (EPH, Permanent Household Survey). The database contains information on individual
wages, employment sector and other standard variables in labor force surveys. Part of the EPH is a
panel and we can use it to track employment decisions across sector pairs and average sector wages.
The top panel of Table 2 shows average wage and employment allocations across our six sectors in the
sample period, 1996-2007. The numbers are normalized with respect to the corresponding national
average. We see important wage differences across sectors. The average wage in Other Manufactures
(e.g., chemicals, plastics) is 1.09, while the wage in Minerals is 0.78. In Food & Beverages, the target
sector in the simulations below, the average wage is 0.82 (meaning it is equivalent to 82 percent
of the average national wage). The Services (non-traded) sector is the largest sector, absorbing 84
percent of the labor force. Food & Beverages employs around 3.3 percent of total employment.
The set of labor mobility cost parameters are given by the direct mobility costs Cjk, a vector of
sector employment quality ηj , and ν, a parameter that determines the variance of the idiosyncratic
utility shocks. As in Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010), the estimation strategy is based on the
conditional choice probabilities (11) and the ex-ante value functions (12). Using (11) and (12), we
can write the ex-ante value function as a function of the probability of staying in the initial sector
of employment as
W jt =
wjt
Pt
+ ηj + β EtW
j
t+1 − ν lnmjjt .(18)
We can also write the difference in expected continuation values as a function of the difference in
choice probabilities
β
(
EtW
k
t+1 − EtW jt+1
)
= ν
(
lnmjkt − lnmjjt
)
+ Cjk.(19)
Using these two results, first exploited by Hotz and Miller (1993) and the ensuing CCP-estimator
literature, we get
Et
[
(lnmjkt − lnmjjt )− β(lnmjkt+1 − lnmkkt+1)− (β − 1)
Cjk
ν
− β
ν
(
wkt+1
Pt+1
− wjt+1
Pt+1
)
− β
ν
(ηk − ηj)
]
= 0.
This is an Euler equation that can be estimated, as in Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010),
by allowing for a disturbance term, ωt+1, which captures the innovation in the stochastic process
of wages, unforeseen at time t. Note that in this Euler equation the expectation is taken over
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realizations of the state st so that it is consistent with any structure in the economy provided it
evolves as a Markov process. In particular, workers expectations are perfectly consistent with our
formulation of firm behavior and this allows us to estimate the labor mobility costs independently
of the capital adjustment costs estimates.
Before writing the estimating equation, we impose some restrictions on Cjk due to data con-
straints. In particular, we will assume a common cost Cm within the manufacturing sectors and
a cost Cnm for movements between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. We also set
the value of the discount factor to β = 0.95. In the end, the set of estimable parameters is thus
{Cm, Cnm, ν, ηj}. We normalize η1 = 0 for the Food and Beverages sector. With these restrictions,
the resulting estimating equation links choice probabilities, mobility costs, and future wages, as
follows
(lnmjkt − lnmjjt )− β(lnmjkt+1 − lnmkkt+1) = (β − 1)
Cm
ν
I1jk − (β − 1)
Cnm
ν
I2jk +(20)
β
ν
(
wkt+1
Pt+1
− wjt+1
Pt+1
)
+
β
ν
(ηk − ηj) + ωjkt+1,
where I1 and I2 are indicators that capture movements within manufacturing and in or out of
manufacturing; that is I1 = 1(j 6= k ∧ j 6= J ∧ k 6= J) and I2 = 1(j 6= k ∧ (j = J |k = J)).
Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) (henceforth ACM) estimate this equation after plugging
in the observed gross flows m from the data.27 In our formulation, this strategy has two main prob-
lems. First, our model includes the employment quality terms η to account for time-invariant wage
compensating differences across sectors. These terms are important so that the wage differences
that are relevant in the workers’ decision to move are purged of potential sectoral compensating
differentials. However, the ηs are not separately identified from Cm and Cnm in equation (20).
Second, and more importantly, the ACM regression is based on linking conditional choice probabil-
ities and observed wages at the sector level and requires a consistent estimate of the probabilities
mjkt . The sample size is given by the pairwise sector combinations and the time periods. When the
choice probabilities are small (recall that these are transition probabilities from sector j to sector
k) they are not precisely estimated in small samples, and the observed frequencies might even be
zero, which biases results (Amemiya, 1986).
To circumvent these problems, we utilize instead an MLE estimator for the choice probabilities,
27In their regression, the level of gross flows across sectors identifies Cjk and the responsiveness of the gross flows
to future wage differences identifies ν. See Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) for the full derivation.
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given by the probabilities predicted by the modelmjkt (Cm/ν, Cnm/ν) and evaluated at the estimates
of the parameters Cm/ν and Cnm/ν. The conditional log likelihood contribution of each worker l
can be written as a function of the normalized mobility cost parameters and is given by
(21) ln `l
(
Cm
ν
,
Cnm
ν
)
=
∑
t
∑
j
∑
k
dljkt lnm
jk
t
(
Cm
ν
,
Cnm
ν
)
,
where dljkt is a dummy indicating whether individual l moved from sector j to sector k at time
t. The log likelihood function is obtained by summing over individuals and using the conditional
choice probabilities (11). Since the only observed heterogeneity across individuals is their initial
sector of employment at each time period, we can write the likelihood function as
(22) lnL
(
Cm
ν
,
Cnm
ν
)
=
∑
t
∑
j
∑
k
Njkt ln
exp
(
−Cmν I1jk − C
nm
ν I
2
jk + W˜
k
t+1
)
∑J
h=1 exp
(
−Cmν I1jh − C
nm
ν I
2
jh + W˜
h
t+1
) ,
where Njkt is the number of workers moving from sector j to sector k at time t. The terms W˜ kt+1
are the continuation values of choosing sector k normalized with respect to non-tradable sector J
and the variance ν, so that W˜ kt+1 = βEt
(
W k(st+1)−W J(st+1)
)
/ν. The normalization does not
affect the choice probabilities. Since the continuation values of choosing a given sector k are the
same across individuals and for all initial sectors of employment, we control for them using sector
of destination-year effects. In the end, we estimate Cm/ν and Cnm/ν using only the expression
for the choice probabilities. The likelihood function is globally concave and thus achieves a global
maximum.28
Plugging these estimates as well as the estimated conditional choice probabilities m̂jkt into (20),
28Dynamic discrete choice problems are often estimated using the conditional choice probability (CCP) and nested
pseudo-likelihood (NPL) methods developed by Hotz and Miller (1993) and the literature thereafter. Because of
aggregate shocks to prices and productivity (and hence wages) captured in the vector of state variables st, the structure
of our model is different from stationary labor or industrial organization applications where state variables vary across
individuals. Intuitively, some variants of the method require estimating choice probabilities non-parametrically, for
all states, without using model parameters. When state variables vary across individuals, as in CCP applications, it
is possible to construct estimates of the choice probabilities for all possible realizations of the state variables, whereas
in our setting we can only compute estimated choice probabilities for the realized wages but not for all other possible
states of the economy. On the other hand, because in our setting state variables determining the continuation values
EtW
k
t+1(st+1) are the same for all individuals, we can use dummy variables to control for these terms and estimate
the parameters using the regular static form for model predicted probabilities in our MLE step. The ACM step is
possible because there are pairwise combinations of sectors of origin and destination.
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we get
(ln m̂jkt − ln m̂jjt )− β(ln m̂jkt+1 − ln m̂kkt+1)− (β − 1)
Ĉm
ν
I1jk − (β − 1)
Ĉnm
ν
I2jk =(23)
=
β
ν
(
wkt+1
Pt+1
− wjt+1
Pt+1
)
+
β
ν
(ηk − ηj) + ωjkt+1.
This regression is run at the sector of origin-sector of destination-year level. The estimates from the
MLE step are regressed on the average sector wage differences, while sector fixed effects account
for the time-invariant employment quality effects η. Since realized wages are correlated with the
innovation terms ω, the regression is estimated using IV with lag wage differences as instruments.
In this step we estimate the structural parameters ν and η and recover Cm and Cnm.29
The estimates of the labor mobility costs are in the bottom panel of Table 2. In the baseline
specification (column 1), our MLE estimates from (22) are Cm/ν=3.740 and Cnm/ν=2.596. The
estimate of 1/ν from (23) is 1.448 (which implies a variance of the idiosyncratic costs, ν = 0.69). All
our estimates are statistically significant. Combining these parameters, we estimate Cm = 2.583
and Cnm = 1.793. This means that, on average, a worker wishing to switch sectors within the
manufacturing sector would pay a mobility cost equivalent to 2.583 times his annual wage earnings.
The costs needed to switch from manufactures to non-manufactures (or vice-versa) is lower, around
1.793 times the value of the annual wage income. Omitting η makes ν lower and thus the mobility
costs lower, too (column 2). If we restrict C to be common to all sectors, we get an average C of
2.393 (with η, in column 3) and of 1.834 (without η, in column 4). Our estimates are lower than
those reported in Artuç, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) for the U.S., where the average moving
cost is around 6.565, and ν is 1.884. This is not surprising giving the potential biases described
above. Allowing for job quality terms η, Artuç and McLaren (2013) estimate more modest C,
ranging from as low as 0.99 to as high as 1.54 (with ν=0.257), also for the U.S. Finally, estimating a
comprehensive model that allows for worker heterogeneity with Brazilian data, Dix-Carneiro (2013)
finds median mobility costs ranging from 1.4 to 2.7. These costs are comparable to ours (though
Dix-Carneiro’s estimates show large dispersion across the population).
29An alternative would be to normalized ν as is usually done in the discrete choice literature. In this case Cm and
Cnm can be estimated in the MLE step and η can be recovered using a minimum distance procedure based on (20).
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4 Responses to Trade Shocks
We now use the model and the estimated parameters to simulate the dynamic implications of a trade
shock in the Food and Beverages sector (Sector 1). Since Food and Beverages is the main export
sector in Argentina, this choice allows us to explore shocks to export opportunities. We model the
trade shock as a permanent price increase in Sector 1. The price increase can be the result of an
increase in world demand or a decrease in world supply, both implying a change in p∗jt. For a small
country and homogeneous goods, the shock takes the form of an upward shift in a perfectly elastic
demand. Since we work with a multi-sector model with tradables and non-tradables, the price shock
to one sector that we study is not equivalent to an economy-wide macro shock.30
We study the transitional dynamics of sectoral capital, employment, wages, profits, output, and
exports. We evaluate differences in short-run vis-à-vis long-run responses and also assess how these
responses depend on the size of the shock (i.e., a small or a large trade shock). We are particularly
interested in the complementarities between trade shocks and the level of the cost of adjustment of
capital, as well as on the role of firm-level investment decisions.
In order to assess the impact of an unexpected increase in export opportunities we create a
stationary economy and shut down all other aggregate shocks. We assume that prices of all tradable
products (pt) are constant, with the exception of the permanent unforseen price increase in Sector
1, that occurs at time t = 1. Consequently, we assume that productivity Aijt follows the same
Markov process as profitability A˜ijt, given by (15) and (16). We further assume that there are no
aggregate productivity shocks, that is, we set bt = 0 ∀t in (15). In the initial stationary equilibrium,
at time t = 0, firms are subject to Markov productivity shocks that create individual fluctuations in
investment, employment and output, while workers are subject to utility shocks that create labor
mobility. At the aggregate level, however, labor allocations, capital, output, and firm distributions
are constant in the initial stationary equilibrium. At time t = 1 there is a permanent price increase
in Sector 1 that triggers dynamic responses. After a transition period, the economy converges to a
new stationary equilibrium, at time T . Shutting down other price shocks and aggregate productivity
shocks allows us to isolate the effect of a trade shock to one sector.
We use the model parameters to simulate the initial stationary equilibrium, the transition period,
and the new stationary equilibrium, for firms and workers. For each time period and sector, we
30This is a key difference with the macro literature featuring factor adjustment costs such as Bloom (2009) and
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). See the discussion in Section 2.4.
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jointly solve the optimal decisions of firms and workers from their Bellman equations. Given that
we shut down aggregate shocks, firms and workers have perfect foresight of firm distributions, labor
allocations, and equilibrium wages during the transition period. The trade shock is a one-time
unexpected shock, but there are no other sources of aggregate uncertainty. The only remaining
source of uncertainty are firm-level productivity shocks A and worker-level utility shocks ε. From
optimal individual decisions we compute aggregate equilibrium variables.
To solve for the equilibrium we discretize the firm-level state variables A and K and use the
following algorithm. First, we start with a guessed path for labor allocations {Njt}Tt=0, firm dis-
tributions {µjt(K,A)}Tt=0, and prices of non-tradables, where 0 and T are the original and new
stationary equilibria and periods in between correspond to the transition. Second, we solve the
firms’ Bellman equation and compute equilibrium-path solutions for the value and policy functions
with respect to the guessed aggregate variables. That is, for each sector j we obtain sequences
of matrices {V j0 (A,K), V j1 (A,K), . . . , V jT (A,K)} and {Ij0(A,K), Ij1(A,K), . . . , IjT (A,K)}.31 Third,
from the firm-level solutions and using the firm distributions µjt , we obtain aggregate labor de-
mands, equilibrium wages (given the labor allocations), aggregate investment demands, aggregate
supply of the non-tradable good, and firm distributions for the following period. We also obtain
responses by firm-types, for example, firm-level investment status (positive investment, negative
investment, and investment inaction). Fourth, wages and prices of non-tradables are plugged in
together with the guesses of N and µ into the workers’ Bellman equation, which has a closed form
solution for equilibrium-path values and can be solved analytically. Finally, labor allocations, firm
distributions and prices of non-tradables are updated and the process is repeated until convergence
to a fixed point in aggregate variables is achieved. Each iteration involves solving the firms and
workers problem jointly, so that all agents form rational expectations about future equilibria and
state variables.
4.1 Increase in Export Opportunities
To document the generic dynamic responses, we begin with the impacts of a trade shock that in-
creases the price of Food and Beverages (Sector 1) by 10 percent. Figure 2 illustrates the mechanics
of the effects in the shocked sector. The immediate implication of a higher price is an increase in
profitability for firms in the sector. Firms want to expand. Capital and employment are predeter-
31We discretize A and K into 20 and 154 grid points. T is equal to 30.
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mined and do not respond initially.32 The nominal wage goes up in Sector 1 due to the increase in
the value of the marginal product of labor. Because of the trade shock, there is an increase in the
price index that brings down real wages in all sectors. The net effect on the real wage in Sector 1 is,
however, positive, as depicted in Figure 2. In the following periods firms invest to adjust their stock
of capital and workers flow to Sector 1 attracted by the higher real wage. Capital and employment
gradually increase until they converge to a new steady state level. Output accordingly increases
and its response is smaller than the response in capital and employment due to decreasing returns
to scale. Real wages decrease with respect to their initial overshot level as labor supply increases in
Sector 1.
There are three reasons why convergence to the new steady state is not immediate, all related to
costs of adjustment and mobility. One reason is convex costs of investment, which provide incentives
to smooth investment over time. The second reason is fixed costs of investment. At the firm level,
fixed costs operate in the opposite direction to convex costs, providing an incentive to concentrate
investment in one period and remain inactive in others. At the aggregate level, however, fixed
costs together with firm heterogeneity generate a gradual reaction to a trade shock. When faced
with a trade shock, firms decide to invest if they are productive enough (relative to their capital
stock) for the returns to investment cover the initial fixed cost. Because idiosyncratic productivity
fluctuates over time and is heterogeneous across firms, firms react to the trade shock sequentially
upon receiving positive idiosyncratic shocks and contributing to a gradual increase in the aggregate
capital stock. The third reason is worker mobility costs. This mechanism is analogous to fixed
costs of investment. After a trade shock to Food and Beverages the wage in this sector increases
relative to other sectors creating an incentive for workers to move. Moving to Food and Beverages
implies paying a fixed mobility cost and workers make this decision taking into consideration their
time-varying idiosyncratic preferences for each sector. As workers receive positive preference shocks
for Food and Beverages, they decide to move and the labor supply in that sector gradually increases.
Increases in capital and employment at the firm level in turn affect the marginal productivity of the
other factor and therefore its aggregate demand, which also contributes to the aggregate gradual
response.
Figures 3 and 4 display the general equilibrium responses in other tradable sectors and in the
32Note that investment at t becomes productive capital in t + 1. In consequence, while there is an investment
response in the first year of the shock, the capital stock remains at the steady state level for one period before
adjusting.
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non-tradable sector. The four other tradable sectors are added up together, and the average wage
is computed using sectoral employment as weight. At the time of the shock real wages go down due
to the increase in the price index, and then partially recover due to the reduction in sectoral labor
supply. Because total labor supply is fixed, employment in other sectors decreases as workers flow
to Sector 1. Capital and output decrease in other tradables, whereas they increase in non-tradables
due to income demand effects. The price of non-tradables adjusts so that supply is equal to demand.
The magnitudes of the responses are given in Table 3. For a 10 percent price shock, the capital
stock in Food and Beverages increases by 6.43 percent initially (Year 2), by 11.15 percent in Year
3, and by 24.38 percent in the new steady state; 95 percent of the transition is covered in 10 years.
Employment increases by 7.25 percent in Year 2, 11.51 percent in Year 3, and 17.73 percent in the
new steady state; convergence of employment is faster than of capital, covering 95 percent of the
transition in 7 years. These responses give rise to increases in output (measured in physical units,
i.e., quantities), by 5.59 percent in Year 2, by 8.76 percent in Year 3, and by 13.52 percent in the
new steady state. Convergence takes 7 years.
Prior to the shock, net exports of Food and Beverages are positive and account for 17 percent of
output. In the model, net exports increase twofold, because of the increase in output and because
of the decline in domestic consumption. The increase in Food prices implies a decrease in domestic
demand from Year 1 onwards, which, since international demand is perfectly elastic, implies a shift
of units previously sold domestically to the export market. This effect is large: for a 10 percent
price shock, the initial response of exports due to a decrease in domestic consumption is of 28.93
percent in Year 1. From Year 2 onwards exports further increase due to the response of output,
reaching a long run response of 103.57 percent in the new steady state. This implies a doubling of
exports. This reaction is so large because exports are initially low relative to domestic consumption
and output.33 Rows (5) and (6) report the percentage of the increase in exports that is explained
by an increase in output and a decrease in domestic consumption, respectively. While exports are
initially only explained by a fall in consumption, the increase in output becomes relevant during
the transition and in fact accounts for about three fourths of the overall response in the long run.
Capital, employment and output in other traded sectors decline. As the real wage increases in
the expanding sector, workers move from other tradables to Food and Beverages, which in turn
33Let x be exports, q be output and c be consumption. It follows that dx/x = (q/x)dq/q − (c/x)dc/c, so that the
proportional change in exports is a weighted average of the proportional change in output and consumption. Since
the export share in output is 0.17, the weights are (q/x) = 5.89 and (c/x) = 4.89.
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triggers disinvestment during the transition. In steady state, employment is 9.5 percent lower in
the non-food manufacturing sector, the capital stock declines by 6.37 percent and output by 6.08
percent. In the non-traded sector, capital, employment and output expand a little. In the short-run,
workers move out, as Food and Beverages wages become relatively higher. However, there is an
increase in the price of non-tradables due to the increase in real income created by the enhanced
export opportunities and the non-traded sector thus expands in the longer run.
We now turn to factor returns. The real wage in Food and Beverage increases by 5.40 percent
at the time of the shock and starts declining gradually after that. In the new steady state, real
wages are only 1.51 percent higher than in the initial equilibrium. This happens because of the
continuous inflow of workers, even though firms keep expanding capital for a few years. Instead,
the average value of a firm increases more strongly and steadily, by 16.48 percent in the immediate
run to 19.69 percent in the long run. We conclude that firms (i.e., the entrepreneurs who own the
fixed managerial ability), more than workers, are the real beneficiaries of the shock.
Real wages in other sectors of the economy are lower after the trade shock. In other-tradable
sectors (non-food manufactures), the decline on impact is of 4.19 percent. As before, there is
overshooting: real wages recover after Year 1 and the long-run decline is of 1.30 percent (with
respect to the initial steady state). Real wages in the non-traded sector also decline, by –0.90
percent in Year 1 and, noticeably, they further decline by –1.63 in Year 2. Wages recover from
Year 3 onwards but never reach the old steady state level, being 0.26 percent lower in the new
steady state. The reason behind the decline on impact in real wages is the increase in food prices
that affects real expenditure. As workers later flow from these sectors to Food and Beverages, the
marginal product of labor increases and wages recover. This recovery is not sufficiently large to
overcome the initial decline. The transition is long, though, and it can take 11 to 12 years to cover
95 percent of path to the new steady state.
4.2 Complementarity
Our model features a complementarity of trade shocks and factor market frictions. This is impor-
tant because, as it is often argued, the success of trade liberalization may depend on complementary
domestic reforms. For instance, a trade reform can fail to have the desired impacts if the domestic
business conditions are inadequate; alternatively, the gains from trade can be amplified by con-
current additional reforms. This complementarity has long been recognized in the literature and,
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recently, it has been moved to the front in the international policy forum. In the link between trade
and jobs, for instance, the International Collaborative Initiative on Trade and Employment (ICITE)
attests to this.34
In our setting, the complementarity of trade shocks and factor market frictions is defined by
the incremental effect of a given trade shock in a scenario with reduced domestic market frictions.
These frictions stem from the cost of capital adjustment and the cost of labor mobility. When there
is a positive trade shock, firms have incentives to invest, but capital and labor adjustment costs
dampen or prevent this expansion. Firms that are unable to overcome the fixed costs of investment
remain in a region of inaction, at least until they receive a high enough productivity shock. Other
firms react to the shock, but their reaction is attenuated because of the uncertainty about future
productivity levels and potential reselling losses in the case of disinvestment. This reaction can also
be attenuated if labor mobility costs halt the reallocation of labor that is needed to complement
capital. With smaller distortions in capital and labor markets, these responses are enhanced. There
is an effect on the extensive margin, since firms may be able to escape out of the inaction region.
There is also an effect on the intensive margin, since firms may fully adjust to the first best optimum.
The extensive margin can be described by noting that the capital adjustment costs, especially
the fixed and irreversibility investment costs, and the labor mobility costs create zones of investment
inaction, where firms with given combinations of idiosyncratic productivity and predetermined
capital stock do not react. This inaction region depends on the parameters of the model—in
particular on the costs of adjustment. Also, it can be shifted, expanded, or shrunk, by various trade
shocks. In Figure 5 we plot the pre-shock steady state inaction region given the estimated capital
and labor adjustment costs. The boundaries of the region are given by the solid black curves labeled
∆p = 0 (referring to a scenario without trade shocks). These two curves delimit three clear zones in
the productivity A and capital K space: positive investment, inaction, and disinvestment. Starting
on the left side of the capital stock grid, firms with low capital and large productivity shocks are
active investment firms. As the productivity shock gets smaller or the stock of capital gets larger
firms choose to stay inactive or to disinvest.
A positive trade shock moves the inaction region to the right (and a negative shock shifts it
to the left). In Figure 5, for a 10 percent price shock, the boundaries are defined by the dashed
34ICITE is a collaborative effort of ten international organizations: the Asian Development Bank, the African
Development Bank, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Interamerican Development
Bank, the International Labor Organization, the Organization of American States, the OECD, UNCTAD, the World
Bank and the WTO. See OECD (2012) for the ICITE mandate and its conclusions so far.
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curves labeled ∆p = 10%. In addition, a larger shock can make it profitable for more firms to react,
and the inaction region moves further to the right (as shown by the dotted-dashed curves labeled
∆p = 30%). On one margin, firms that were inactive in the baseline start investing after the shock.
On the other margin, firms that were disinvesting find it now optimal to become inactive. While the
shifts in curves do not appear to be large, the contour curves show that the inaction region is dense
in terms of the distribution of firms (there are 82 percent of inactive firms in the ∆p = 0 region),
therefore a small shift in curves implies a change in behavior for a significant number of firms. The
inaction region depends on the structure of capital adjustment costs and of labor mobility costs. In
the limit case of no fixed costs of investment, the inaction region disappears entirely.
Next, we define the complementarity formally and we quantify it in the data. To do this, we
simulate a counterfactual scenario in which a trade shock to Food and Beverages takes place in
the absence of both fixed costs and irreversibility costs. We keep the convex costs, which induce
smoothness, as well as the original labor mobility costs (which we reduce later in the paper). As in
the previous section, the price shock occurs at time t = 1, it is unexpected, and there are no sources
of aggregate uncertainty past the shock.
To formalize the complementarity, let Γ denote the estimated adjustment cost parameters, which
are the ones used in the simulations of the previous section, and let Γ˜ denote a counterfactual cost
structure without fixed costs and irreversibilities in investment, that is, γ˜1 = 0 and γ˜3 = 1. Let
the (J − 1) × 1 vector p denote prices of tradables prior to the shock, and the vector p˜ denote
the price vector after the shock. The vectors p and p˜ are time invariant and differ only in the
price of Food and Beverages. Because there is no aggregate uncertainty, we can write the firm-level
and aggregate-level solutions as a function of the exogenous prices p. We can also explicitly write
the solutions as a function of the cost parameters, Γ. We use the case of capital as an example.
Aggregating over the distribution of firms, aggregate capital κ in sector j can be written as
(24) κjt+1(p,Γ) =
∫
(K,A)
Kijt+1(A,K, p,Γ)µ
j
t (dK × dA|p,Γ).
We are interested in comparing an initial steady state under the estimated adjustment cost param-
eters and original price vector (p,Γ) with a counterfactual scenario in which a price shock occurs
under the alternative cost structure (p˜, Γ˜). That is, in the case of capital, we are interested in
quantifying the response κjt+1(p˜, Γ˜) − κjt+1(p,Γ). Algebraically, the capital response to a change
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in prices and cost structure can be written as
κ(p˜, Γ˜)− κ(p,Γ) = [κ(p˜,Γ)− κ(p,Γ)] +
[
κ(p, Γ˜)− κ(p,Γ)
]
(25)
+
([
κ(p˜, Γ˜)− κ(p, Γ˜)
]
− [κ(p˜,Γ)− κ(p,Γ)]
)
.
The three terms in the decomposition are: (i) the effect of a change in prices p, at the initial
cost structure; (ii) the effect of a change in the cost structure Γ, at the initial prices; (iii) the
complementarity between p and Γ, defined as the incremental effect of a change in prices at the new
cost structure. In order to isolate the contribution of each counterfactual change, the experiment
is based on the simulations of four situations: (p,Γ), (p, Γ˜), (p˜,Γ) and (p˜, Γ˜). The previous section
dealt with the comparison of situations (p,Γ) and (p˜,Γ).35
The complementarity effect on aggregate capital is displayed in Figure 6. From t = 1 onwards,
the solid black line denotes the 10 percent price effect—this is the same response as in Figure 2.
The vertical distance between the solid black line and the dashed grey line denotes the steady state
effect of the change in cost structure. The complementarity is the vertical distance between the
dashed and solid grey lines; this is the incremental effect of trade in the absence of fixed costs and
irreversibilities in investment. The figure shows a sizeable complementarity effect.
The complementarity effect on the capital stock is quantified in Table 4, Panel A. The table
displays the four terms in equation (25). As expected, the total response of the aggregate capital
stock is much larger with a combined shock to trade and to the cost structure. For a 10 percent price
shock, the combined shock causes capital to increase by 29.06 percent in Year 2, by 36.32 percent
in Year 3, and by 46.23 percent in the long-run (vis-á-vis 6.43, 11.15, and 24.38 percent following
a trade shock under the original cost structure; row (i)). The transition period is also shorter as
one of the reasons for a gradual transition—fixed costs of investment—has been eliminated. The
second component reflects the steady state effect of a change in the cost structure (row (ii)). In the
absence of fixed costs and irreversibilities, the steady state aggregate capital stock is 17.62 percent
higher.36 In the short-run, the complementarity (component (iii)) is of the same order of magnitude
35Note that in Kambourov (2009) and Khandelwal, Schott and Wei (2013), the comparison is made between
situations (p,Γ), (p˜,Γ) and (p˜, Γ˜). Since simulations do not include a situation (p, Γ˜) the complementarity is thus not
directly quantified.
36Notice that this effect is constant over time. This is because it is a steady state effect and not a transition
response. When shocking both p˜ and Γ˜ there is the alternative of shocking them sequentially or simultaneously. We
opt to shock them sequentially, so that the exercise represents a trade shock (p˜-p) to two different economies (Γ and
Γ˜.)
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as the pure price effect: capital expands by an additional 5.01 percent due to the complementarity.
This implies that the short-run response of the aggregate capital stock is 77.9 percent higher in
a scenario with no fixed costs and no irreversibilities. In the long-run, the complementary losses
power: it creates an additional expansion in K of only 4.23 percent, which is equivalent to 17.33
percent of the trade shock effect.
The complementarity matters during the whole transition but is particularly important in the
short-run. This is because in a scenario without fixed costs and irreversibilities there is a quick and
strong reaction of investment in Year 1 and of capital in Year 2 by firms that would otherwise be
inactive in the short run, whereas in the long run, upon drawing positive idiosyncratic shocks, firms
gradually react in both scenarios. This implies a stronger short-run complementarity between trade
shocks and domestic conditions driven by an extensive margin. The effect of the change in structure
also becomes less relevant in the long run relative to the trade shock, for the same reason.
To quantify the role played by the extensive margin in the complementarity effect, we compute
the capital response of initially inactive firms and their contribution to the response in aggregate
capital. Firms are characterized by pairs (K,A). From equation (24) the total capital response
can be written as the aggregation of the responses by firm type (K,A), plus the aggregation of the
changes in firm distribution, that is
κjt+1(p˜, Γ˜)− κjt+1(p,Γ) =
∫
(K,A)
[
Kijt+1(A,K, p˜, Γ˜)−Kijt+1(A,K, p,Γ)
]
µjt (dK × dA|p,Γ) +
+
∫
(K,A)
Kijt+1(A,K, p˜, Γ˜)
[
µjt (dK × dA|p˜, Γ˜)− µjt (dK × dA|p,Γ)
]
.(26)
Let ι denote the set of (K,A) firm types that are inactive in the baseline steady state (scenario
(p,Γ))). The extensive margin of the total increase in capital is thus given by
κιjt+1(p˜, Γ˜)− κιjt+1(p,Γ) =
∫
(K,A)∈ι
[
Kijt+1(A,K, p˜, Γ˜)−Kijt+1(A,K, p,Γ)
]
µjt (dK × dA|p,Γ).
(27)
The extensive margins of the three components of equation (25) are defined analogously.37
Results for the extensive margins are displayed in Panels B and C of Table 4. There are two
results to highlight. First, Panel B shows that with fixed costs and irreversibilities, initially inactive
37The extensive margin is not defined in terms of firm identity but rather in terms of grid points. Firms receive
idiosyncratic shocks and in the long run move all over the (K,A) grid.
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firms respond to a trade shock by increasing their capital by 4.26 percent in Year 1 (component (i)).
When fixed costs and irreversibilities are eliminated, there is an incremental response of inactive
firms of 6.09 percent, which is 142.94 percent of the trade shock response, vis-á-vis 77.90 percent
for all firms (Panel A). Similar patterns are observed during the other years of the transition and
the long run. The complementarity effect is thus relatively more important for inactive firms than
for all firms taken together. Second, Panel C depicts the percentage contribution of inactive firms
to the response of aggregate capital. In Year 1, inactive firms explain 38.81 percent of the total
capital response, 51.53 percent of the response to the trade shock, 18.32 percent of the response
to the change in cost structure, and 94.55 percent of the complementarity. Large contributions are
expected since the initially inactive firms account for 82 percent of firms. What is interesting is
that inactive firms are relatively more relevant in explaining the complementarity effect than the
trade shock and cost structure effects, and that the extensive margin accounts for the bulk of the
complementarity.38
The complementarity of trade shock and capital adjustment costs has implications for the ad-
justment of other variables in the economy. We begin with Food & Beverages employment, output
and exports, and we report results following a 10 percent trade shock in Table 5. As expected, the
impacts are much larger with a combined shock to costs and trade, and the transition faster. The
complementary effect arises in all these responses. As opposed to the case of capital, however, the
complementarity effects are generally small. For employment, the expansion in employment is only
6.88 percent larger in the short run and 2.45 percent larger in the long run. The complementarity
has a slightly larger role on output, accounting for an additional 8.10 (short run) and 6.66 (long
run) percentage response. Comparable effects are reported for Food exports.
The impact of the complementarity on factor rewards is also typically small, as shown in Table
6. The complementarity has a small effect in Year 2, of 2.65 percent. It becomes, however, more
important during the transition (Years 3 to 5) and in the long run, when the complementarity is
equivalent to more than 10 percent of the trade shock effect. This is because the trade shock effect
in the baseline is decreasing during the transition, as workers flow to Food and Beverages (see Table
3). The complementarity also creates a higher response in the value of the firm (present value of net
profits) by 2.95 percent (short run) and 4.62 percent (long run). The quicker investment adjustment
in the early years of the transition due to the complementarity implies a higher real wage in Food
38In the long run the contribution of the extensive margin is above 100 percent. This is because changes in firm
distribution (equation 26) contribute negatively to the complementarity effect.
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and Beverages and a distribution of the gains from the trade shock towards workers in the sector.
As this effect vanishes, the gains from the interaction of adjustment costs and prices shift towards
firms.
The complementarity also affects the real wages in the other sectors of the economy. In the
case of other tradable sectors, recall that the trade shock to the Food and Beverages sector creates
a fall in real wages, as the CPI increases. The complementarity goes in the other direction, and
actually creates an increase in wages. In the long-run, for example, while the pure price effect
would cause real wages to decline by 1.3 percent, the complementarity would boost them up by
0.17 percent. This means that real wages would still decline if the trade shock occurred in an
environment with lower capital adjustment costs, but they would be slightly higher nevertheless.
This force is actually much stronger in the non-tradable sector. Here, the complementarity effect
(in the long-run) is positive but actually higher (in absolute value) than the pure price effect. This
means that while the trade shock reduces wages in the non-traded sector when capital adjustment
costs are high, the trade shock would actually lead to higher real wages if adjustment costs were
low.
An important result of our model is that the complementarity effect depends on the size of the
shock. We show results in Figure 7, where we plot the complementarity (relative to the price effect)
for different trade shocks (from 5 to 30 percent) and for the short-run (Year 2) and the long-run
(the new steady state). In general, we find that the complementarity effect losses power as the
shock becomes larger. Consider first the case of capital (top left panel). In Year 2 following a 5
percent shock, for example, the complementarity is almost as important as the pure price effect
(i.e., a complementarity of 100). For a 30 percent shock, the complementarity is only equivalent to
66.10 percent of the price effect. In the long-run, these effects remain positive, but are much more
similar, 18.46 percent in the case of a 5 percent price shock and 14.52 percent in the case of a 30
percent price shock.
These results are driven by the incentives for inaction generated by the investment costs. In
the baseline scenario, a larger price shock implies that it is easier to overcome the fixed cost of
investment and a larger proportion of firms respond in the short-run (relative to a small shock).
This in turn implies that the incremental price response when fixed costs and irreversibilities are
eliminated (cost structure Γ˜) is smaller for a large price shock. To put it differently, if the price
shock is small when adjustment costs are high, fewer firms will find it optimal to adjust investment
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immediately after the shock. In the absence of those costs, thus, the same small price change will
induce a much larger response of many of those firms that choose inaction in the baseline. As the
trade shock grows larger, these differential responses become smaller. In the long-run (in steady
state, but also after about 5 years in our simulations) most firms have already adjusted and thus
the differential responses narrow.
For Food and Beverages employment, a higher price shock creates a lower complementarity both
in the short- and in the long-run (Figure 7, top-right panel). Unlike the case of capital, for very
large shocks, the long-run complementarity almost vanishes. Similar patterns are found for Food
and Beverages Output and Exports. In the case of real wages in the affected sector, there is still
a decreasing pattern in that a higher trade shock elicits a lower complementarity. However, unlike
previous variables, this complementarity is higher in the long-run than in the short-run because
the real wage overshoots in the short-run and thus the price effect, which we use to benchmark the
complementarity, becomes much smaller in the long-run.
4.3 Capital Adjustment Costs and Labor Mobility Costs
In our previous simulations we have focused the attention on the role of capital adjustment costs.
Our model, however, also features labor mobility costs C. As we have argued above, we work with
these costs to create equilibrium wage differences across sectors. This allows for more meaningful
factor adjustments following the shock, because labor may respond differently when sectoral wages
are different. In this section we explore trade shock complementarities with both capital adjustment
and labor mobility costs.
To do this we run simulations analogous to the ones in the previous section adding a reduction in
mobility costs to the elimination of the investment fixed costs and irreversibilities. In the simulations
in the previous sections we compared a baseline steady state described by the model parameters
(p,Γ, C) and a counterfactual scenario in which we shock the price and change the capital adjustment
cost structure (p˜, Γ˜, C).39 In this section we now compare the same baseline steady state (p,Γ, C)
to a counterfactual scenario in which we also change the mobility cost structure (p˜, Γ˜, C˜). In the
counterfactual scenario we arbitrarily reduce labor mobility costs by half. The trade shock is again
a 10 percent increase to the price of Food and Beverages. We again decompose the total response
into a trade shock component, a cost structure component (that includes a change in both Γ and
39To simplify notation we did not write variables or scenarios as explicitly dependent on C in the previous section,
since C was kept constant.
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C), and the complementarity effect or incremental trade shock response. A summary of results is
in Table 7.
In the economy with lower mobility costs, as expected, the capital stock, employment, output
and exports in Food and Beverages react more to a given price shock during the whole transition.
In addition, the complementarity is noticeably stronger. For the case of capital, for instance,
the short-run relative complementarity is 77.9 for the economy with high C (Table 4) and 89.77
percent in the economy with lower C (Panel A of Table 7). Since the reduction in C favors worker
mobility, the increase in the complementarity is even larger for employment. The short-run relative
complementarity for employment is 6.88 with high C (Panel A of Table 5) and 46.91 with reduced
C (Panel B of Table 7). This means that in an economy with reduced capital adjustment costs the
trade shock effect on employment is 6.88 percent larger than in the baseline economy, whereas in an
economy in which labor mobility costs are reduced by half (in addition to the reduction in capital
adjustment costs), the trade shock effect on employment is in turn 46.91 percent larger than in the
baseline economy. These results highlight that the economy reacts even more strongly to the same
trade shock when capital and labor adjustment costs are both smaller. In other words, the trade
shock creates incentives for investment and these incentives are boosted by better joint business
conditions in both capital and labor markets. Similar stronger complementary effects are found in
output (Panel C), and exports (Panel D).
Workers in Food and Beverages earn higher real wages after the joint shock (Panel E). The joint
complementarity, however, is negative. This means that real wages would increase less after a given
price shock when both capital and labor adjustment costs are lower. This is because the lower C
facilitates the inflow of workers following the shock and this erodes the gains. Smaller labor mobility
costs make in fact labor less specific and act as a wage-equalizing force across sectors. In contrast,
the value of the firm instead increases much more under the joint shock and the complementarity
is positive and strong. The fact that the sectoral specificity of labor is lower when C is low benefits
entrepreneurs who have a larger pool of workers to hire.
Finally, we explore the relationship of the complementarity and the size of the shock in Figure
7. For capital, employment, output and exports in Food and Beverages, we find as above that the
complementarity is much larger when both capital and labor costs are lower. Also, the complemen-
tarity for employment is much stronger when C is lower because lower labor mobility costs facilitate
labor reallocation after a price shock. This effect, combined with an stronger complementarity for
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capital as well, shows up for output and exports too. For wages, the opposite happens and the
complementarity becomes negative. In all cases, the complementarity is smaller as the size of shock
becomes larger. The intuition is the same as before: with lower costs of adjustment, a sufficiently
large price shock induces a more profound adjustment for all firms and induces more firms (and
workers) to react in the short-run, leaving thus little room for any complementarity to operate.
5 Conclusions
We have developed a structural dynamic general equilibrium model of trade and the labor market
with factor adjustment costs. Firms make intertemporal investment decisions facing capital ad-
justment costs that include fixed costs, convex costs and investment irreversibility costs. Workers
choose employment sector based on equilibrium intersectoral wage differences and labor mobility
costs. These costs include various labor market frictions such as imperfections in firing and hiring
workers as well as specific utility shocks. The model features general equilibrium effects, articulating
both the product and the labor market, in a multisector economy. This allows us to analyze the
interplay between trade shocks and factor adjustment costs. We have fitted our model to household
survey panel data and plant-level panel data from Argentina and recovered measures of the adjust-
ment frictions faced both by workers and firms. Using the structural parameters, we have simulated
the response of the model, both of firms and workers, following a positive trade shock to the Food
and Beverages sector. Shocks to other sectors or multiple shocks can also be considered.
With factor adjustment costs, the economy adjusts sluggishly both in terms of firm-level invest-
ment and of the labor market. Covering 95 percent of the transition to the new steady state can take
ten years for capital and seven years for employment. Real wages in the Food & Beverages sector
increase on impact, but then partially decline as firms gradually hire more workers. Real wages in
all other sectors decline on impact, but then partially increase as worker flow to the shocked sector.
Firm value increases gradually. As expected, the shock creates a distributional conflict favoring
workers and firms in the Food & Beverages sector at the expense of workers and firms elsewhere.
Our model features a complementarity of trade shocks and domestic reforms. This is because
the cost of factor adjustments create inaction regions for both firms and workers and the incentives
for inaction (and for action) depend jointly on the trade shock and on the costs of adjusting labor
and capital. We have explored this theme by simulating counterfactual scenarios with trade shocks
and reductions in capital and labor adjustment costs. As expected, the economy reacts more
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to a combined shock. More importantly, the complementarity is stronger when the trade shock
occurs in an environment with lower factor adjustment costs. The trade-capital complementarity
is very responsive to the capital adjustment costs, while the trade-employment complementarity is
more responsive to the labor mobility costs. In addition, the complementarity is stronger in the
short-run than in the long-run. This is because, with lower capital and labor adjustment costs
that affect investment and worker inaction, adjustment occurs more quickly and strongly. As the
economy adjust, the complementarity losses strength. Finally, the complementarity becomes less
relevant under larger trade shocks because larger shocks can create incentive to adjust even under
adjustment costs.
Our analysis emphasizes this interplay between trade reforms and complementary domestic
policies related to frictions in factor markets. In an economy with distortions, firm investment
inaction can be prevalent. Workers may also find it too costly to reallocate. A trade shock can
thus have little or no impact on the economy. A larger shock may overcome those limitations and
a stronger response may take place. For instance, a United States limited preference granted on
a specific product may be of little consequence for a least developed country facing high frictions,
but can have sizeable impacts on economies with better functioning factor markets. In turn, a
broad regional trade agreement may have sizeable effects, even in very distorted economies, though
those effects could be much stronger in less distorted economies. As a consequence, joint trade and
domestic reforms may significant boost the gains from trade.
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A Appendix
A.1 Construction of the Firm-Level Dataset
We express all monetary variables in real terms. We deflated wages by the consumer price index
and firm’s variables using the wholesale price index. In particular, we deflated investment, capital
and intermediate inputs by the general level of the index. Gross revenue, sales and profits were
deflated using the four digit disaggregation of the index.
To construct the real investment series, we generate an initial measure of the real capital stock
at the plant-level and then complete the series using the perpetual inventory method, Kf,t+1 =
(1−δ)Kft+Ift, where Ift is real investment, Kft real capital stock, and δ is the capital depreciation
rate. Real investment is defined as Ift = Eft − Sft, where Eft is real gross expenditures on capital
equipment, and Sft is real gross retirements of capital equipment.
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Since our dataset does not contain information about the book value of capital, we approximate
the initial capital stock of the firm as the average across years of the ratio between the amount
of capital depreciation declared by the firm and the estimated depreciation rate. We deflate our
measure of initial capital stock by the general level of the wholesale price index. We use an aggregate
depreciation rate estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the United States. Our
depreciation rates include both in-use depreciation (which reflects declines in the efficiency of the
asset because of aging or wear and tear) as well as retirements or discards (which reflects, for
example, obsolescence).
A.2 Robustness of Capital Adjustment Costs Parameters
Here, we assess the robustness of our capital adjustment costs estimates to variants of the choice of
moments. We report results in Table A.1. In the main specification, we match four moments: the se-
rial correlation of the investment rate, the correlation between the investment rate and profitability,
positive spikes at 20 percent and negative spikes at –20 percent (positive and negative spikes refer
to the percentage of firms that invest and disinvest at different thresholds). In the specifications in
the Table, we keep the first two moments (see Bloom, 2009; and Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006)
and we experiment with different spikes as well as with percentiles of the investment rate instead of
the spikes. As it can be seen, the estimates are pretty robust to changes in moments that capture
investment bursts.
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Figure 1
Distribution of the Investment Rate
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Source: Encuesta Industrial Anual (Annual Industrial Survey), Ar-
gentina 1994-2001. The investment rate is the ratio of investment to
capital stock.
Figure 2
Responses to a Trade Shock
Capital, Real Wage, Employment and Output
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Simulation of a 10 percent increase in the price of Food & Beverages.
Dynamic responses of capital, real wage, employment and output in the
shocked sector.
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Figure 3
Responses to a Trade Shock. Other Tradable Products
.1
.0
5
0
−.
05
−.
1
−.
15
−.
2
−.
2
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
C
ha
ng
e
−5 0 5 10 15 20
Year
Capital Employment
Wage Output
Simulation of a 10 percent increase in the price of Food & Beverages.
Dynamic responses in the other four tradable sectors. Average response
in wage is computed by weighting sectors according to participation in
employment.
Figure 4
Responses to a Trade Shock. Non-tradables
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Simulation of a 10 percent increase in the price of Food & Beverages.
Dynamic responses in the non-tradable sector.
44
Figure 5
Inaction Regions and Firm Distribution
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Top panel: Curves delimit long run equilibrium regions of positive invest-
ment, inaction, and negative investment for a baseline situation without
changes in prices (Δp = 0, solid), a 10 percent price increase (Δp = 10%,
dashed) and a 30 percent price increase (Δp = 30%, dotted-dashed).
Contour curves denote the distribution of capital and productivity at the
baseline.
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Figure 6
Complementarity of Trade Shock and Capital Adjustment Costs
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Black solid line: simulation of a price shock of 10 percent. Grey solid
line: simulation of a price shock of 10 percent under a counterfactual
initial situation of no fixed costs and no irreversibility. Grey dashed line:
vertical shift of the black solid line accounting for differences in initial
steady states.
The black solid line depicts a price effect under the original cost structure.
The vertical difference between the grey dashed line and the black solid
line depicts the effect of the change in cost structure. The vertical differ-
ence between the solid and dashed grey lines depicts the incremental price
effect under the counterfactual cost structure (the complementarity).
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Figure 7
Complementarity of Trade Shock and Capital Adjustment Costs
Relationship to the Size of the Shock
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Complementarity defined as the incremental effect of a trade shock in the presence of reduced capital adjustment costs, relative
to the trade shock effect under the baseline cost structure. Black solid line is the short-run (Year 2) complementarity. Grey
solid line is the long-run (steady state) complementarity.
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Figure 8
Complementarity of Trade Shock and Capital and Labor Adjustment Costs
Relationship to the Size of the Shock
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Black solid line is the short-run (Year 2) complementarity with reduced capital adjustment costs while the black dashed line
is the short-run complementarity with reduced capital and labor adjustment costs. Grey solid line is the long-run (steady
state) complementarity with reduced capital adjustment costs while the grey dashed line is the long-run complementarity with
reduced capital and labor adjustment costs.
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Table 1
Production Function and Capital Adjustment Costs
Structural Parameters
A) Production Function
Parameters labor (αL) capital (αK)
Manufacturing 0.5892∗∗∗ 0.1420∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0423)
Non-Manufacturing 0.3402 0.1153
B) Stochastic Process and Depreciation
Parameters ρe σe δ
0.8853∗∗∗ 0.6652∗∗∗ 0.0991
(–) (–) –
C) Capital Adjustment Costs
Parameters γ1 γ2 γ3
0.1451∗∗∗ 0.1132∗∗∗ 0.9143∗∗∗
(0.0358) (0.0245) (0.0705)
Moments corr(i, i−1) corr(i, a) spike+ spike−
Observed 0.188 0.121 0.139 0.011
Simulated 0.149 0.306 0.135 0.013
Source: EIA, Encuesta Industrial Anual (Annual Industrial Survey). Panel A: Esti-
mates of the production function parameters. Panel B: Estimates of the profitability
markov process parameters. Panel C: Estimates of the adjustment costs parameters,
and comparison of observed and simulated moments. The moments are the serial
correlation in investment (corr(i, i−1)), the correlation between investment and prof-
itability (corr(i, a)), the percentage of firms with investment above and below 20%
(spike+ and spike−).
49
Table 2
Labor Mobility Costs
Data and Parameters
A) Data
Food & Textiles Minerals Metals Other Services
Beverages Manufactures
CPI weight 0.313 0.052 0.025 0.025 0.211 0.384
Average Wages 0.82 0.84 0.78 0.86 1.09 0.96
Labor Allocation 391 222 92 229 868 10,069
B) Estimates of Labor Mobility Costs
Baseline Single C
η no η η no η
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cm/ν 3.740∗∗∗ 3.740∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.084)
Cnm/ν 2.596∗∗∗ 2.596∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.104)
C/ν 3.258∗∗∗ 3.258∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032)
1/ν 1.448∗∗ 1.826∗∗∗ 1.361∗∗ 1.776∗∗∗
(0.611) (0.220) (0.563) (0.175)
η2 -0.365∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.067)
η3 -0.365 -0.318
(0.297) (0.272)
η4 -0.596∗∗∗ -0.692∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.121)
η5 -0.494∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.166)
η6 0.174 0.265∗
(0.147) (0.139)
Cm 2.583∗∗∗ 2.048∗∗∗
(0.819) (0.241)
Cnm 1.793∗∗∗ 1.421∗∗∗
(0.685) (0.208)
C 2.393∗∗∗ 1.834∗∗∗
(0.747) (0.179)
Source: Panel component of EPH, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (Permanent Household Survey). First
panel shows participation of each sector in expenditure, average wage, and sample size. Second panel shows
estimates of labor mobility cost parameters.
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Table 3
Responses to 10 Percent Trade Shock to the Food & Beverages Sector
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 5 Steady Years to
State Convergence
A) Food & Beverages
Capital Stock – 6.43 11.15 17.73 24.38 10
Employment – 7.25 11.51 15.65 17.73 7
Output – 5.59 8.76 11.84 13.52 7
Exports 28.93 68.01 81.14 96.38 103.57 6
due to production 0.00 0.48 0.63 0.72 0.76 –
due to consumption 1.00 0.52 0.37 0.28 0.24 –
B) Other Tradables
Capital Stock – -0.29 -1.68 -3.78 -6.37 12
Employment – -2.95 -5.12 -7.45 -9.50 10
Output – -1.85 -3.43 -4.92 -6.08 9
Exports 17.36 17.47 30.09 39.33 47.09 10
due to production 0.00 0.43 0.46 0.51 0.53 0
due to consumption 1.00 0.57 0.54 0.49 0.47 0
C) Non-Tradables
Capital – 1.31 1.42 2.55 4.46 13
Employment – -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.17 16
Output – 0.22 0.18 0.36 0.62 12
D) Factor Rewards
Wages in F&B 5.40 4.42 2.96 1.92 1.51 8
Value of Firms in F&B 16.48 17.60 17.99 18.87 19.69 5
Wages in Other Tradables -4.19 -2.43 -2.32 -1.80 -1.30 11
Wages in Non-Tradables -0.90 -1.63 -0.95 -0.56 -0.26 12
Simulation of a 10% trade shock in the Food & Beverages Sector. Percentage responses for capital, employ-
ment, output, exports, and wages. Year 1: Year of shock. Long Run: Year 30. Transition: number of years
to converge to 95% of the long run value.
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Table 4
Complementarity of Trade Shock and Capital Adjustment Costs
Response of Capital to a 10 Percent Trade Shock to the Food & Beverages Sector
Year 2 Year 3 Year 5 Steady Years to
State Convergence
A) Response of Aggregate Capital Stock
Total response 29.06 36.32 43.07 46.23 6
(i) Trade shock 6.43 11.15 17.73 24.38 10
(ii) Cost structure 17.62 17.62 17.62 17.62 –
(iii) Complementarity 5.01 7.54 7.72 4.23 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 77.90 67.60 43.55 17.33 –
B) Response of Capital Stock
Initially Inactive Firms
Total response 14.50 16.24 17.43 18.15 5
(i) Trade shock 4.26 4.92 5.40 6.24 7
(ii) Cost structure 4.15 4.15 4.15 4.15 –
(iii) Complementarity 6.09 7.17 7.88 7.76 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 142.94 145.76 145.84 124.25 –
C) Contribution of Initially Inactive Firms
to Response of Aggregate Capital Stock
Total response 38.81 34.80 31.50 30.56 –
(i) Trade shock 51.53 34.32 23.72 19.93 –
(ii) Cost structure 18.32 18.32 18.32 18.32 –
(iii) Complementarity 94.55 74.00 79.43 142.87 –
All results refer to changes in aggregate capital in the shocked sector.
Panel A): total response of aggregate capital to a trade shock of 10% and a change in the cost structure in which fixed
costs and irreversibility of investment are eliminated. Row (i) is the trade shock component; row (ii) is the change in cost
structure component; and row (iii) is the incremental price response or complementarity. See equation (25).
Panel B): extensive margin. Capital response of firms that do not invest in the baseline steady state to the same trade
shock and change in cost structure as in Panel A).
Panel C): Contribution of the extensive margin to response of aggregate capital stock.
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Table 5
Complementarity of Trade Shocks and Capital Adjustment Costs
Responses of Employment, Output, and Exports
Year 2 Year 3 Year 5 Steady Years to
State Convergence
A) Employment Food & Beverages
Total response 15.17 19.72 23.81 25.58 6
(i) Trade shock 7.25 11.51 15.65 17.73 7
(ii) Cost structure 7.42 7.42 7.42 7.42 –
(iii) Complementarity 0.50 0.79 0.74 0.43 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(ii) 6.88 6.90 4.75 2.45 –
B) Output Food & Beverages
Total response 16.65 20.28 23.58 25.03 6
(i) Trade shock 5.59 8.76 11.84 13.52 7
(ii) Cost structure 10.61 10.61 10.61 10.61 –
(iii) Complementarity 0.45 0.92 1.14 0.90 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 8.10 10.45 9.60 6.66 –
C) Exports Food & Beverages
Total response 123.47 140.06 153.49 158.47 5
(i) Trade shock 68.01 81.14 96.38 103.57 6
(ii) Cost structure 50.98 50.98 50.98 50.98 –
(iii) Complementarity 4.49 7.95 6.14 3.92 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 6.60 9.79 6.37 3.79 –
Total response of aggregate variables to a trade shock of 10% and a change in the cost structure in which fixed
costs and irreversibility of investment are eliminated. Row (i) is the trade shock component; row (ii) is the
change in cost structure component; and row (iii) is the incremental price response or complementarity. See
equation (25). Results refer to changes in employment, output and exports in the shocked sector.
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Table 6
Complementarity of Trade Shocks and Capital Adjustment Costs
Responses of Wages and Firm Value
Year 2 Year 3 Year 5 Steady Years to
State Convergence
E) Wages Food & Beverages
Total response 6.73 5.47 4.36 3.89 7
(i) Trade shock 4.42 2.96 1.92 1.51 8
(ii) Cost structure 2.19 2.19 2.19 2.19 –
(iii) Complementarity 0.12 0.31 0.25 0.19 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 2.65 10.62 12.84 12.90 –
F) Firm Value Food & Beverages
Total response 27.15 28.21 29.19 29.63 3
(i) Trade shock 17.60 17.99 18.87 19.69 5
(ii) Cost structure 9.03 9.03 9.03 9.03 –
(iii) Complementarity 0.52 1.19 1.29 0.91 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 2.95 6.61 6.84 4.62 –
G) Wages Other Tradables
Total response -1.79 -1.43 -0.99 -0.51 13
(i) Trade shock -2.43 -2.32 -1.80 -1.30 11
(ii) Cost structure 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 –
(iii) Complementarity 0.03 0.27 0.19 0.17 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) -1.06 -11.66 -10.74 -12.82 –
H) Wages Non-tradables
Total response -0.38 0.26 1.02 1.38 8
(i) Trade shock -1.63 -0.95 -0.56 -0.26 12
(ii) Cost structure 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 –
(iii) Complementarity -0.09 -0.14 0.25 0.30 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 5.40 14.42 -43.99 -116.86 –
Total response of aggregate variables to a trade shock of 10% and a change in the cost structure in which fixed
costs and irreversibility of investment are eliminated. Row (i) is the trade shock component; row (ii) is the
change in cost structure component; and row (iii) is the incremental price response or complementarity. See
equation (25). Results refer to changes real wages and firm value in the shocked sector as well as on real wages
in other manufactures and non-tradable goods sectors.
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Table 7
Complementarity of Trade Shocks, Capital and Labor Adjustment Costs
Year 2 Year 3 Year 5 Steady Years to
State Convergence
A) Capital Food & Beverages
Total response 29.56 38.03 45.51 47.50 5
(i) Trade shock 6.43 11.15 17.73 24.38 10
(ii) Cost structure 17.36 17.36 17.36 17.36 –
(iii) Complementarity 5.77 9.52 10.43 5.75 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 89.77 85.32 58.85 23.58 –
B) Employment Food & Beverages
Total response 17.78 23.03 26.62 27.19 5
(i) Trade shock 7.25 11.51 15.65 17.73 7
(ii) Cost structure 7.13 7.12 7.12 7.14 –
(iii) Complementarity 3.40 4.40 3.85 2.32 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 46.91 38.24 24.63 13.10 –
C) Output Food & Beverages
Total response 18.26 22.45 25.53 26.14 5
(i) Trade shock 5.59 8.76 11.84 13.52 7
(ii) Cost structure 10.40 10.39 10.39 10.41 –
(iii) Complementarity 2.27 3.30 3.30 2.21 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 40.54 37.63 27.89 16.32 –
D) Exports Food & Beverages
Total response 163.93 183.43 195.42 196.06 4
(i) Trade shock 68.01 81.14 96.38 103.57 6
(ii) Cost structure 84.30 84.12 84.09 84.37 –
(iii) Complementarity 11.62 18.17 14.95 8.12 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 17.09 22.40 15.51 7.84 –
E) Wages Food & Beverages
Total response 8.41 7.01 6.11 5.98 5
(i) Trade shock 4.42 2.96 1.92 1.51 8
(ii) Cost structure 4.88 4.87 4.87 4.87 –
(iii) Complementarity -0.90 -0.82 -0.68 -0.40 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) -20.29 -27.79 -35.51 -26.35 –
F) Value of Firm Food & Beverages
Total response 31.52 32.58 33.62 33.91 3
(i) Trade shock 17.60 17.99 18.87 19.69 5
(ii) Cost structure 11.62 11.60 11.60 11.62 –
(iii) Complementarity 2.30 2.99 3.16 2.60 –
Relative complementarity (iii)/(i) 13.06 16.62 16.73 13.22 –
Total response of aggregate variables to a trade shock of 10% and a change in the cost structure in which fixed
costs and irreversibility of investment are eliminated and in which labor mobility costs are reduced by 50%.
Row (i) is the trade shock component; row (ii) is the change in cost structure component; and row (iii) is the
incremental price response or complementarity. See equation (25). Results refer to aggregate variables in the
shocked sector.
55
Table A1
Capital Adjustment Costs Robustness
Fixed Convex Irreversibility
Cost Cost Cost
(1) (2) (3)
A) Preferred Specification
Positive Spikes=20%; Negative Spikes=–20% 0.1451 0.1132 0.9143
(0.0358) (0.0245) (0.0705)
B) Other Specifications
Positive Spikes=20%; Negative Spikes=–5% 0.1407 0.0538 0.9995
(0.0799) (0.0552) (0.1910)
Positive Spikes=20%; Negative Spikes=–10% 0.1498 0.0756 0.9740
(0.0412) (0.0150) (0.0815)
Pctile 80 Pctile 5 0.0902 0.1312 0.9878
(0.0047) (0.0359) (0.0153)
Positive Spikes=15%; Negative Spikes=–5% 0.0977 0.1063 0.9969
(0.0440) (0.0245) (0.1072)
Positive Spikes=25%; Negative Spikes=–5% 0.0614 0.0000 0.7560
(0.0601) (0.0007) (0.1473)
Positive Spikes=15%; Negative Spikes=–10% 0.1142 0.1329 0.9994
(0.0541) (0.0531) (0.1481)
Positive Spikes=25%; Negative Spikes=–10% 0.1499 0.0247 0.8800
(0.1106) (0.0353) (0.2545)
Positive Spikes=15%; Negative Spikes=–20% 0.0018 0.0077 0.4461
(0.0016) (0.0067) (0.0123)
Positive Spikes=25%; Negative Spikes=–20% 0.1489 0.0386 0.8229
(0.2530) (0.1004) (0.4143)
Pctile 80; Pctile 3 0.0020 0.0183 0.5158
(0.0104) (0.0247) (0.1115)
Pctile 80; Pctile 8 0.0865 0.0659 0.9998
(0.0109) (0.0164) (0.0308)
Pctile 75 Pctile 5 0.0016 0.0489 0.5853
(0.0003) (0.0146) (0.0040)
Pctile 85; Pctile 5 0.1499 0.0618 0.9556
(0.1642) (0.0618) (0.2672)
Notes: All specifications include four moments and all share the serial correlation of the investment rate
and the correlation between the investment rate and profitability. Positive and Negative Spikes refer to the
percentage of firms that invest and disinvest at different thresholds. Pctile refers to the percentiles of the
investment rate.
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